Trinity College Philosophy Journal

Month: December 2022

Silencing the sirens and sprites; a critique of the male’s de-feminized (and idealized) approach to women’s life, language, and philosophy

by Hayden Foldhazy, Philosopher

The world is a self-evident place: a reflexive and historical one not so easily understood. Modern times are enveloped simultaneously by modern and archaic thought, in so much as the changes which pervade our philosophy and language, both our practical and ideal ways of life, continue to be directly influenced by the markers of our past; no less than our foresight – rarely of a pure reformative nature – deems these markers necessary or contingent, whilst also positing new ones for the roads we pave ahead. 

The woman, incontestably propounded the Other by such thinkers as Simone De Beauvoir and writer Ingeborg Bachmann, is no exception to this process of idealization; as imposed by the unfortunateness of a male dominated society, ie., a male dominated history. Treated as a marker by her male counterparts, even in today’s more politically augmented social realm, the woman and her ideal is often left to the realm of the past; as if – and I hate myself for using this analogy – she is some attic-dwelling knickknack, that shan’t change but only further herself into yesterday. By this account, ie., a historical one, the woman has been relegated to a position absent of her own willing-choice: to be an autonomous voice, thinker, and overall being. This is because the man, by and large, has stood tall above this history of the world and has made the past his own; domesticating the woman to certain roles and places. Women were forced – at most points in time and still to great extent today – to become wives, childbearers, and mistresses in the name of a greater male outcome with no consideration for her own call to life. Disgusting does not begin to describe it, but perhaps – as I wish to explore here – Bachman’s declaration can: You humans! You monsters! (a, pp. 178). In the most literal and material senses, through her Undine gehta, we shall see how the man has reshaped and refined history to his liking; in a manner that has not left the woman untouched but has rather subsumed her under this Other, or immanent, thing: as projected. And further, via comparisons to De Beauvoir’s own life and thought, we shall bring to light the modern ways men continue to subdue the woman’s autonomous voice; in both philosophy and the aforementioned literature.  

Beginning with this term immanent – if I am to paraphrase De Beauvoir’s The Second Sexb – we unanimously refer to the ideal of woman as inwardly driven and directed toward the physical realm; embodying a stagnant nature, in which habit exceeds ascendance. Of course, granted the position of the man as the counterforce that has made women wives and mistresses, we can fairly reason that this immanence is not of her explicit fault. She has been subdued, ultimately, to these images (or ideals); that we shall explore further, later on through mythological and literary de-feminization by male writers and thinkers. An important thing to note here, however, is that – according to De Beauvoir – the woman is in no way inherently lacking her analogue’s transcendent nature; ie., the man’s attitude of outward extension into the world, directed toward the divine and intelligible realms (b, pp. 441 – 443). It is merely that, through her historical relegation to positions such as wife or mother, she is often rendered incapable of achieving this sort-of male status of enlightenment. She must remain in marriage or in the household. The full extent of the world, where the male’s sun (and sons) shine over the horizon of opportunity and autonomous creation, remains a closed entity to her. But how exactly has this happened? And how might we mend this superficial gap created by the sexes between the sexes? First, and most advantageously, we should proceed through the experiences of women, written and explicated by women. Thus, we return to Bachmann. 

We see this paradox, between the man (as self) and woman (as Other) – but also, by extension, the self against self within both species – expressed best through Bachmann’s mythological allusion to the undine, in her Undine geht. Traditionally, deriving from German mythology, the undine is an elemental water sprite; liminal by design, and thus capable of transcending the border between the human and spiritual realms. Thus, similar to De Beauvoir’s argument for the woman, it does not lack one nature or the other, as either masculine or feminine; it posits both, yet is limited to the immanent position by its counterpart. Bachmann, through her Undine geht, narrates a very personal story of conflict and love between the Undine – whose voice she embodies – and men in general named Hans, through this disposition to the water; ie., the realm of immanence. Though water alludes of course to some level of fluidity, which may be interpreted as transcendence, the narrative relegates the water as less involved, or intelligible, than the land belonging to the Hans (that we shall explore indepthly just a bit later). The elemental Undine opines, “I love the water, its dense transparency, the green in the water and the dumb creatures (I too shall soon be equally dumb), my hair among them, in it, the just water, the indifferent mirror that forbids me to see you differently. The wet frontier between me and me…” (a, pp. 178). There are two important notes to take from here in further analyzing the Undine as more immanent to the Hans of society. Firstly, in claiming a love for the water, the Undine makes clear her position of inwardness via a nostalgic attachment to her own realm. She, in adopting this projection of man, is rendered incapable of escape. A water elemental, nonetheless liminal, should fundamentally belong to and arise from the world of water. She describes herself as in it, amongst the dumb creatures; which is our second important acknowledgement. This is a direct assertion of the water as somewhere less intelligible to the land, ie., as something more physical and indifferent (or mediocre) where women must reside. Rather, as transcendent men, the Hans of the society are not forced to belong amongst these dumb creatures nor do they wish to venture, “into that element in which no one builds a nest, raises a roof over rafters, covers himself with an awning. To be nowhere, to stay nowhere,” (a, pp. 178). The Hans, by this account, are free beings ironically more fluid than the Undine. They are dynamic and self assertive which enables them to build a society from the ground, ie., the land, upwards. The Undine, however, must remain a vassal to be sought by the man in his loneliness. And once he is done with her, to the water she must always return; that groundless realm where nothing she is producing or produces can stand.

To compare this with modern issues of society, a common difference – expounded by feminist movements – seen between men and women today is their willingness to change for one-another. Most often referred to as the double standard, women are – to a profoundly higher degree – expected to change their inherent personalities to conform to the male dominated society: the one of transcendence. By these means they become, and are forced to become, more masculine. Immanence is – seemingly – to be forgotten. Bachmann makes allusion to this phenomena via the notion of the Undine’s elemental nature, as water, and that of the clearing. The clearing, wherein the Undine always meets a man named Hans, accordingly represents the male dominated society that seeks to reshape her by striking the water from her arms, and licking the dew from her hair (a, pp. 177). To remove the water from the water sprite means to change the very being -itself; and in return the male offers no recompense, ie., no amendment of his own position. He does not join the water sprite in her realm – to become more feminine – or seek to grant her access to his own. He expects the world to surrender itself to him for nothing, and the modern world has consequently begun to (rightfully so) clamor him for it. We see this abundantly today in the working realm, to which men and women are purportedly now equally admitted. But it is simple to see the irony here, should we open our eyes to the material world, as men so often do not, looking upon their red flags with red-tinted frames. Orientation in thinking is important to make note of here as well; granted the man is raised to think transcendence is the solution for autonomy; as if god is becoming of him. Nevertheless, aside from the easily recognizable pay gaps between them, there are also the issues of representation and accommodation for women workers; who, of course, have social and biological limitations that do not necessarily overlap the male’s. These are – but are not limited to – menstruation, childbirth, constant fear of sexual assault and harassment, and being a minority in male dominated professions. I do not mean to present these as disadvantages, but merely explicate their social constructivism and the differences they create between the sexes regarding the aforementioned: representation and accommodation. Eg., the woman who bears a child and must take leave from work is rarely accommodated for such absence, with pay that is; as if she should be punished for something, frankly, out of her control (See c and e). Though it is her choice – at least in instantiated circumstances – to have a child, it is not her explicit desire to put her own life on hold and abandon the working environment. This she lacks control over; the hardships of childbirth and child raising are far too physically and mentally exhaustive to allow for both activities to persist. Further, eg., the woman who constantly fears harassment is seen as hysterical or irrational; as if – from the male’s vile perspective – she was not asking for it: “…crying it out, Hans, Hans…,” (a, pp. 177). Nevertheless, her fostering of yet another male ideal, ie., of something like motherhood or mistress, leads once again to her punishment by the male. It is a rather ass backwards concept to wrap one’s head around; one that the Undine seeks to understand here: “You monsters, that was why I loved you, because you knew what the call meant, because you allowed yourselves to be called, because you were never in agreement with yourselves,” (a pp. 181). The Hans understand what it is that they do, in purporting their own transcendence as the path of least resistance – toward a self willing life – whilst simultaneously leaving the Undine in her dark obscuring tides. Life is played like a game by them.

Additionally from Undine geht, continuing via the juxtaposition made of the Undine, the Hans, and their wives; Bachmann comments on the double standard confounded by the very institution of marriage, through an interesting notion of language. It is presented as a force of ensnarement, securing the woman within these social positions via relegation to ideal figures, known only by self-conception of word:

You who make women your mistresses and wives, one-day wives, week-end wives, lifetime wives and let yourselves be made into their husbands. (Perhaps that is worth waking up for.) You with your jealousy of your women, with your arrogant forbearance and tyranny, your search for sanctuary with your women; you with your housekeeping money and your joint good-night conversations, those sources of new strength, of the conviction that you are right in your conflicts with the outside world, you with your helplessly skillful, helplessly absent-minded embraces. I was amazed to see that you give your wives money for the shopping and for clothes and for the summer holiday, then you invite them out (invite them, that means you pay, of course). You buy and let yourselves be bought (a, pp. 180).

We see here that the Hans are essentially capable of relegating all of the women in their lives to these various positions of companionship – as wives, one-day wives, etc. – without any consequences becoming their sole position as husband. And further, as the Undine, Bachmann describes the male tendency toward jealousy and their overall self-contradictory natures – to buy and let themselves be bought – belonging once again to this modern notion of the double standard. After all, men are excessively and scarily more likely to confront and assault women on the bases they are unfaithful, or simply not fulfilling their duties as a lover or wife. But the man, irregardless, does not need to prove this same sentiment to the woman. The word wife carries much more weight than that of the husband, as she is expected to subsume herself under the husband and the sanctity of the marriage; whereas, in Bachmann, we see the man flee his home the first chance he can scrounge, to entertain himself with whom he call mistresses such as the Undine, who herself seeks true companionship and becomes angry with man’s continued unfaithfulness. De Beauvoir similarly comments on the power marriage (as an ideal) extends to the male, by means of his literal, material taking a wife. The act of communion – once the woman has said the words I do, and transformed into a bride – allows him to dip  his toes into the realm of immanence, but only to anchor himself to the social construct that marriage – as an archaic practice, and au fond realization of religious dowry – has enabled him as superiority; at best to raise a family, and yet nonetheless such that he may still escape the household in the dark of night, just like the Hans to seek his fun elsewhere (b, pp. 442 – 445). Language-itself is an extremely important notion to continue with from here, as being the idealization of power that allows men to subdue the societal position of women, to the mere immanent realm; what I ultimately hope to demonstrate here, through Bachmann and De Beauvoir, as the underlying cause for obstruction of the Other’s own lack of self-realization.

When the woman says I do, the man takes his wife. Preliminarily however the woman must be called a woman, such that the man can relegate her nextly to the position of wife. The language at play here is already, historically speaking, one of subservience. But let us return to Bachmann once again, and consider the very notion (or word) – in the most abstract terms – of the undine, so that we might better understand this. The process of de-feminization, after all, has taken its most grandiose form from literature that spreads false ideas on material concepts and beings. Many classical myths written by men, because only they were entrusted to read and write – and to embody those intelligible qualities – depict women as such as muses and sirens; another characteristic of the traditional undine, alluded to by Bachmann through the call. Undine we’re often shown residing in ponds and near waterfalls, singing their alluring songs to attract male suitors; and Bachmann’s own Undine takes up this role by asking the man to, “Come. Just once. Come,” (a, pp. 186). An important question is raised by this idealization of the undine, granted the material woman has been reformulated by the male author into some divine and to be feared creature of myth (ie., idea). What if, absent of any writing man’s intention, the undine as a being itself simply desired to sing for singing’s sake? To be independent? Ie., as figures created by men, mythological beings like the undine possess no means of autonomous creation or real being for themselves. From De Beauvoir, we see that the woman’s being is formulated as, “subordinate, secondary, parasitic…the very meaning of her life is not in her hands,” and this begins at their conception; their relegation, by male language and attitude, to the immanent place of the ideal woman. Their singing voices, their beauty and all else, were crafted by men for men. Thus, in this sense, Bachmann’s Undine geht provides a fervent commentary on the very male-designed nature of the woman-itself, as pure ideal, and literature as a tool for this continued means of subjugation to certain words or nouns; just as De Beauvoir proves through historical, philosophical notions. Overall, they both suggest this relegation to nouns, such as wife, leave the woman in a position absent of autonomy or joy. Consider more ardently De Beauvoir’s description of the work conscripted by idealized marriage: “The woman’s work within the home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly useful to society, it does not open out on the future, it produces nothing,” (b, pp. 442). To produce nothing means her work is considered without purpose and thus a work done beside herself; for the sheer intent of defending the male and male society. And so, it remains a struggle for women authors to find their creative voice because her purported natural position has always been one directed by the male’s compass. This is not to say women have not tried or succeeded in self production. Merely from a materialist stand, his voice has preceded hers in telling which direction to take the story, which characters to write, and how they should behave.  

This is all to summarily say books written by men  – and all other things from which language arises as word or speech or sign – will appeal more enthusiastically to men; but not as if they contain any right, as any sort-of pure knowledge of what is good or is in general. It is merely a historical appeal governed by the ruling vehemence and language. Thus, when the transcendent attitude dominates so too will literature and all other parts of society seek ascendance; and consequently abandon any other means of self-realization. Bachmann, as Undine, further states to demonstrate this phenomenon of language’s permeance and male guidance, “Never was there so much magic over things as when you spoke, and never were words so powerful. You could make speech flare up, become muddled or mighty. You did everything with words and sentences, came to an understanding with them or transmuted them, gave things a new name; and objects, which understand neither the straight nor the crooked words, almost took their being from your words,” (a, pp. 186). And so, we can see just how much power is held behind the simple terms crafted by those transcendent male literates: of woman, of wife, of undine and so on. By merely naming her Undine – along with coining terms for all other objects of the world – the Hans have conquered the world-itself. The world, inadvertently, has become a reflection of them (ie., those terms and language) because the world-itself, the land, is a fundamentally male ideal. They have sought, in giving the Undine her voice, to simultaneously strip her of it and its considered-seductive power; even though they were the ones to first posit her seductiveness and seek her company.

Contradiction, as Bachmann has already told us, is the nature of life for all, the Undine and the Hans alike. But by these same means the Hans have unequivocally captured the linguistic power of contradiction between idea and object, to place themselves above the immanent and the women within it. Whilst he can think! be! and speak out!, she does not understand and cannot understand (a, pp. 181) The dictionary written by the man, ie., the language he creates and contorts, will speak for none other than himself. He has the material power to change his willing-being. The ideal of the woman however, crafted by men for men, inherently lacks her experiential basis in this world for the men have always tried to talk themselves over her: to silence her alluring song without ever truly listening. Margaret Simons makes a good example of this regarding De Beauvoir’s own publications – especially of The Second Sex – and the historical interpretations provided by male philosophers (and translators), who have often subordinated her works under the likes of male existentialists Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Some as she further notes even claim Sartre to have written De Beauvoir’s works, excluding her name from their citations, consequently overlooking any possibility for an original thought to have arisen from a woman. The relationship between De Beauvoir and Sartre is commonly misstated and exaggerated; formulating her as a  figure of dependence (ie., immanence). And very rarely is she even mentioned by name, with some male thinkers simply referring to her as that woman and then proceeding in great detail to encounter Sartre (d, pp. 104, 106). Truly, I must give credit where credit is due: for us males, as the ‘intelligible ones’, to have gone to such remarkable lengths to prove ourselves the other way around; and take no credit for it. How humble indeed! But I digress, it is sufficiently evident from these experiences we have hence endeavored – by and through women – the extent to which the male has subsumed the use of language in all its contradictory nature – as the torture house of being – over his female half; both within and outside of himself.

And so, to conclusively reiterate this notion of idealization and de-feminization, I ask; is it not the case that the woman whose nude body we have so longingly encased in marble is placed – unquestionably – freely on the museum floor, whilst the woman who wishes merely not to wear a bra in public – to seek domain over her body –  is condemned? The separation between the ideal woman and the material being has imposed such a great harm to her existence in this world, to the point she has – as Bachmann says – taken her being directly from the crooked words of a male society’s creation. This subordination, first and foremost, begins with language and has been perpetuated throughout history by the male dominated literature (and its interpretations) of ideals. The sprite we are taught to  worship and the siren we are told to fear have unanimously represented one being: the woman. And her voice, first shattered and then silenced by her male counterparts, will slip unheard into the trench of the immanent sea should we not come, just once, and listen. Ground yourself in the material of the woman, even if you are not one; do not seek to transcend it. You are but a dumb creature too, who likes to play at god and treat the world as mere soil when the world – come the day we shall all dissolve from our ideals of men and women – uses you only as fertilizer. Because the world cares not which you are or which you choose to be; it simply asks to remain whole through us. This is self-evident. 

Notes

aBachmann, Ingeborg. Undine geht, The Thirtieth Year: Stories, Translated by Michael Bullock. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., NY, 1964. pp. 177 – 187.

bDe Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex, Translated and edited by H.M. Parshley. Lowe and Brydone (Printers) LTD., London, 1956.

cGovernment of, U.S. “The Federal Register.” Federal Register, Part 825 – The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, United States Department of Labor, 6 Feb. 2013, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-V/subchapter-C/part-825#825.217.

dSimons, Margaret A. Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., MD, 1999. pp. 101 – 114.

eWisniewski, Megan. “In Puerto Rico, No Gap in Median Earnings between Men and Women.” Census.gov, United States Census Bureau, 20 Oct. 2022, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/03/what-is-the-gender-wage-gap-in-your-state.

The self in Kantian reason; opposing the referential self in favor of the Nishidan reflexive (or religious) worldview

by Hayden Foldhazy, Philosopher

The Kantian form of reason, following the self-critical procedure of the Critique of Pure Reasona, most notably remains an issue of transcendence; one that has attracted criticism and reformulation from many who describe it as too abstract. That is, in seeking to understand or grasp some semblance of reason -itself (bloße Vernunft), Kant proposed we must search outside of the phenomenal world belonging to and arising from the senses; so as to endeavor those absolute, non experientially conditioned maxims of reason, its principles, and its products. To do so however one must work from within reason -itself: the inescapable, transcendental condition upon which all knowledge is – as a final stopping point – purportedly realized. An important outcome of this study of reason by reason was the Kantian claim that knowledge of self is an impossibility – floating in noumena – via an early, semantic notion of the I as mere contentless subject, transcendentally designated. The I, using his logic of subject, lacks any direct affirmation (or negation) of oneself; acting as a mere indexical to synthesize determinate, particular conscious acts under one universal form of awareness. But before we proceed with exploring how this transcendental condition ultimately influences a philosophy of knowledge of the self – what Kant opposes at every turn, and only defends in terms of self-consciousness – it is important we understand what procedure pure reason follows in necessarily realizing our knowledge. Thus, let us begin with illustrating (what I shall call) the Kantian procession of thoughtful attainment; starting from the very beginning: seeing, touching, hearing, etc. 

All objects first encountered in the world via the senses are considered by Kant to be appearances, separate – only by means of their connectivity to reason and the understanding, and not necessarily in quality – from the things in themselves (das Ding an sich) [a, A251]. Object-appearances are given through intuition (Anschauung) as singular representations of sensibility, which are then thought through the understanding (Verstand) via concepts. The thing in itself is often reformulated as illusory – ie., seemingly real but nonetheless impossible or contradictory – for it can only be posited by the power of reason -itself, and never truly encountered or grounded in experiential terms. Perhaps it would be better to explicate this in the following terms: what Kant calls transcendental illusions contain, aside from pure intuition, judgments that inadvertently re-orient our form of pure reasoning with fallacy. The key word here, for differentiating the reasonable and intuitable, are the grounds of judgments; for judgments that lead to illusion are – more often than not – entirely subjective [a, B350-352]. Subjective judgments are particular in nature, and thus derive from a particular subject’s state of mind rather than proving something universally instantiable: ie., objective. Consider a common example, between that of sensible reality and dreams (ie., illusion). If I dream that I am in Hokkaido but am in fact on the other side of the world, upon waking from my dream I may for a short while think myself there. However, there are several things (processes) that allow me to dispel this illusion of my own condition rather quickly. One, once I am up and out of bed, I can simply look from my window and reconsider my objective position. Two, I can deliberate via reason with another person – say, my roommate who occupies the same house – that we have not been magically transported overnight. Illusion is thus easy to avoid when one, in perfect unity, combines the sensible intuitions and practices of pure reason; although ironically it is from reason -itself these transcendental illusions arise and from their arisal are ultimately considered necessary to reason [a, B354]. We shall not endeavor into this further. It is however important to take away from this talk of illusion that there is a critical difference, relayed by Kantian reason, between what is knowable and what is not. Appearances, because they are representations of phenomenal objects – and are hence attained by sensibility – are known; whereas das Ding an sich are a product of reason’s own illusion and cannot be called knowable for they are noumenal. Returning to our above example – having reasoned through our current state of experience – allows us to claim I have dreamed; but not the happenings of this dream were real. Thus reason, as critiqued by reason -itself, becomes an activity of self-imposed limitation. 

The knowable things (ie., the subjects of knowledge) are always grounded simultaneously in experience as derived from the senses, further explicated through the understanding and its consciousness of concepts, and lastly synthesized through reason’s faculty which subsumes the whole of the understanding under maximizable principles applicable to all rational beings [a, A299]. Kant refers to this process of conscious synthesis as the unity of apperception, through which all knowledge is conditionally possible – on experiential grounds which keep us on soil as sensibly intuited, and the transcendental condition of reason to exceed the world via in-experientiable, conscious processes grounded in the concepts of understanding; and their ultimate extension into the universal [a, A300]. What is alluded to here, far before any actual claims are made in favor of it, is the categorical imperative: the ethical opus and maxim of Kant’s philosophical project into practical reason [b, 421-422]. As we have already mentioned through our conversation on illusion – and as is further explicated here – reason is very much based within its own limitations and possibilities. Kant makes a great effort to always posit this in an auspicious manner nonetheless. Granted our capacity of reason is now one of margins – one of boundaries and high walls that themselves do not reach heaven (ie., transcendence) – we would seem to be trapped in the phenomenal world. We would also seem to not be free, and more importantly – for our endeavor – it makes an explicit claim that knowledge of self (and further knowledge of knowledge -itself) is impossible. 

Thus, we seem in need of something – at the very least – redemptive to our hopes and dreams which are now nothing but transcendental illusions; to our soul which is now fantasy, and to our gods which are nothing but principles confounded by reason’s necessity of absoluteness [See a, The paralogisms of pure reason]. After all, the absolute stand point of reason in many ways restricts rather than implicitly exuding freedom to all, or delegating each of us to an equal faculty of reason – itself. However, I myself do not deny his proceeding claim; that without limitations a freedom would ironically not exist at all. Laws like gravity are, simultaneously, crushing and restrictive to the imagination; and yet fundamentally, without said laws, we would know nothing of what it is like to fly. The imagination -itself would be purposeless in a world of infiniteness; ie., one in which laws are null and we act autonomously as gods. It would be quite boring incidentally. We, I will reiterate, do not disagree here. 

What I and other philosophers disagree with on the other hand, in spite of this contention for freedom as self-binding, is the means by which limitation is imposed; through the Kantian form of reason and its – decisively – contentless existence, as something seemingly inactive. Consider this from the abstract terms imposed by the categorical imperative. Maxims which are universally instantiable fundamentally lack experiential grounds – a prominent member (claim) of almost all Western ethical theories – by means of their referential method of positing reason -itself. Ethics is always seen as something noumenal, abstract, and transcendent; with no claims to be asserted of its material and historical uprising. Once again, from the standpoint of the categorical imperative, consider the very formulating act of Kant’s ethical argument whilst bearing in mind the historical circumstance of conception: the Enlightenment. Like all the rationalists inspired by the movement, Kant voids any materialist notions from the categorical imperative by working only through abstract lines of reason – said to envelop all places and all times of rational beings; through allusion to a common principle (of reason) he never once expands upon in the Critique, the Groundworks (in which it is postulated), or anything later [b, 391]. Pure moral philosophy is his goal – void of any empiricism, that would consider the way in which people act a posteriori, so as to determine these absolute, abstract grounds of morality (from reason -itself’s own abstractness). Kant entirely opposes such a motion for emotions and grounded experiences – what he commonly denotes as private happiness – to structure morality here:

Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed [b, 442].

But the issue I raise to this is the manner by which emotions directly influence our actions, and rather make reason an active form of intuition; through feelings (kanjō, 感情) and impulses (shōdō, 衝動) themselves. Rarely are these features of mind ignored, for what better – for what good – do we act more commonly than through gut feelings? These notions – and I shan’t call them notions any longer, for we all know them by heart – are definitive of a contentful self we are all made aware of through our own experience. And so it is not enough to merely deny their causal effect on action and acting, and abstract from them an ideal of perfection not anywhere on this earth; to merely reference the divine without willing it conscientiously. And so I say, the Kantian notion of the grounds of reason – as taking the form of some universal principle, purely transcendent – can not remain so (abstract) in the case of a historically framed and contentful world; and further, what I will argue for as a reflexive self, should they continue to persist in a maximizable manner. The particulars – of experience and people – must ultimately be reconsidered. My argument, following from the likes of Kitarō Nishida, makes reason -itself a material concept; an actively moving and self-orienting force, which Kant may ultimately have agreed to – to some extent – in his later essays such as What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? where he discusses the practical uses of theoretical judgements. Still, however, I have some doubts about this. But I digress; with our basic form of Kantian reason in mind, it is now time we see how reason is applied by Kant to and through the self; as the notion of self-consciousness but not self-knowledge, via indexicals. Then we shall proceed with mine and Nishida’s favorment of a religious worldview, and expound upon this source of active intuition.

Indexicals are, semantically speaking, ways of denoting oneself, others, or objects –  such as I, he/she, you, that, etc. – in terms of reference. Consequently they change meaning at every particular instance with which context is dependent. Eg., the I used whence referring to myself is not the same as the I you would use to refer to yourself. And so for sentences such as I walked to the store or I read the newspaper, there is a contextual link between the subject I and the thing being done (the action/verb); but nothing that discloses the thing being done as denoting an implicit quality of the I. This semantic process is best described as a self-reference without any means of true identification of the particular to which it references; and thus can be called universal. Kant himself denotes this as the transcendental subject of thought, through which one is said to be conscious of oneself but not known to oneself [a, A355]. The further split made by Kant – here – is of delineating the inner sense from that of the outer. The inner, where the harbor of self-consciousness non-objectively presents itself as thinking subject, is not to be confused with the outer sense, wherein: “…bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense, and not things in themselves…we cannot intuit their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc. externally; for all this belongs before inner sense,” [a, A358].

Nishda would not disagree with Kant here; neither does the Japanese language. To know the desires or feelings of another directly is impossible but not underlyingly, mediately contentless. Rather, the action of desiring to know one’s feelings is actively intuited; not merely abstracted from their bodily presence as immediately void. Consider, eg., from the Japanese language, the two statements I want an apple (watashi ha ringo ga hoshī, 私はリンゴが欲しい) and she wants an apple (kanojo ha ringo wo hoshigatte iru, 彼女はリンゴを欲しがっている). Depending on the topic of the sentence, the adjective want (hoshī, 欲しい) changes grammatical form to add a layer of uncertainty in declaring another’s desire, but remains affirmative for the self. However, the want of the other is not in any way denied possibility and – as I have stated – becomes actively, or mediately sought by the speaker via want’s change in form; as hoshī becomes hoshigatte iru (欲しがっている): meaning more closely, from the above,  (I think) she is wanting an apple. This may seem unimportant for our discussion of the self, pure reason, and all we have just been discussing; but I assure you, this will bring to light significant claims made by Nishida against Kant that we shall now delve into!

Backtracking just a few steps, let us return to the Kantian argument that empirical principles are not to be considered for universal endeavors of moral law; for this is where Nishida begins his Nothingness and the Religious Worldview:

To Kant, religion has significance as a vehicle that supplements morality. I cannot find in Kant any autonomy given to the religious consciousness itself. Perhaps he never even considered religion as an autonomous sphere. I contend, however, that the religious form of life does not fall within the sphere of mere reason, bloße Vernunft. That is why one who discusses religion must experience, to some extent at least, religious sentiment…[c, pp. 49].

Here we can see Nishida bring to the forefront his notion of kanjō, (感情); the so called religious sentiment of everyday experience that must be intuited within the world and not in transcendental form, floating above it. He greatly opposes the idea that a mere formal theory of moral consciousness (of self) can accurately depict the ways real people make decisions; as what action consists of, (ie., producing),  and what it possibly produces, (ie., product). Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative and moral self takes advantage of this separation between the act of constructing, as a thinking subject, and what is intuitively constructed, as an objective thing. People are rather incredibly emotional beings and ones who do not conform, as he puts it, to stagnant law and such a separation of material. Much like Kant himself argues regarding private happiness; the beauty is left in the eye of the beholder. What he suggests however, to amend such differences amongst people, are common transcendental predicates – derived from pure reason’s illusory faculties – to heteronomously guide the actions of all, and simultaneously provide a sense of autonomy. As we have already expounded, autonomy will by some means always require limitations; thus what concerns Nishida and I are not the limitations but their enforcement. How will we come to realize this common principle of reason if only through pure rationality? There must be material considerations to mend the paradoxical relationship imposed by the starry heavens and the moral law within. Abstracting from the material basis – the time and place of thought – will only lead to further idealization and confusion amongst individuals who will then have no idea what the universal right is. Is it not the case after all that beauty standards and all those things we call transcendent themselves change with passing time? Reason, just like the indexical I, should change with the times and context; something entirely ignored within the Critique and in The Groundworks. A common example of moral dilemma I often return to, as to expunge such universal mockery of emotional weight as is necessary to reason, is something like the trolley problem. Given a junction of train tracks whereon differing sides lie ten people and one person; the universal claim to life demands that more people should survive but without any real explanation: any material one. Pure rationality cannot solve this problem, just as pure moral theory attempts through it. As soon as you ask the person, well, why should the ten people survive?, they cannot provide any answer aside from a sentimentally justified one. Well, ten peoples’ deaths would weigh more on my conscience. Thus, they position themselves from a vector of goodness derived on impulse. The relationary status between you and the people is what fundamentally matters; and not the connection between you and the moral law sitting on its throne in the sky. Interactivity, for people – as thinking beings and bodies – and particles of matter alike are always reciprocal and dynamical. In other words, for every reaction there is always an equal and opposite reaction; and wholly the world is persevered through these particular events [b, pp. 51-52]. There exists, however, no reciprocity between the moral law and people if it is lifted from the world and its current conditions. 

Life as an autonomous self, from this account, becomes a form of creative expression – what Nishida calls expressive activity (hyōgen sayō, 表現作用) – which is consistently changing form and thus bleeds content upon the place of its standing and simultaneous birth [c, pp. 52]. It is also referred to later on by Nishida as pure apperception (junsui tōkaku, 純粋統覚) in place of the hyōgen sayō – taking explicit influence from Kant’s own faculty of apperception. Nonetheless, they are very different on the following grounds: junsui tōkaku is not a manner of isolated, ie., detached, thinking of something, but is itself grounded in the material, reflexive behavior of the world. We see this here, where, “…each self-conscious world is a momentary vector of historical world-space, which mediates its own objective self-determination within itself, and infinitely determines itself through its own process of self-expression,” [c, pp. 59]. 

More poignantly; morality, god, and the self are all reformulated as reflections of the self nature and not in reference to some unknowable thing – ie., something noumenal. Thus to know the self, ie., in Kantian terms the transcendental subject or I, we need not search beyond our own immanent place in the world, and constitute perfection as pure ideal. We do not seek to know the theoretical self where this pure reason hangs its hat precisely because there is no posited (or possible) place for its hat to truly hang. There must be a historical, or experiential, component to all facets of reason; and especially to a reason seeking to know itself. And so – from Nishida – the personal self conducted via personality as a point of absolute standing – rather than one of meager particularity or a universally idealized law –  is what dominates the conception of the good for all and what guides the self to act morally through the hyōgen sayō of willing will. Kant, as Nishida puts it, sought to find this transcendent plane for reason to reside in by seeking wholeheartedly to know the fact of knowing, or to know the fact of self – something Kant ultimately dismissed with metaphysics altogether. Whereas Nishida on the other hand sought to know knowing as is, through its existential basis and active forms. Pure perfection, beauty, god, and all those transcendental predicates – according to Nishida – are not just ideals sprung from reason but markers of the self-forming individual. They are not mere postulates of theoretical reason which may exist outside of us, as Kant calls supersensible entities, unprovable by reason’s own design; they are but only through us existent, in so much as through them, too, we exist. To alleviate the headache this paradox may entail, he provides this quote from Daitō Kokushi:

Buddha and I, distinct through a billion kalpas of time,

Yet not separate for one instant;

Facing each other the whole day through,

Yet not facing each other for an instant (c, pp. 78).

The notion of the reflexive nature of the self is solidified here as a dynamic, affirmative and self-negating expressive force reciprocated between the hyōgen sayō and the world’s own fluidity. This world, he makes clear however, is not some abstractable place wherein transcendental, pure reason arises. It is a concrete matrix of the logical form, wherein self-transformation is itself made possible and is ultimately realized. This he refers to as the place (basho, 場所) of all self-conscious activity [c, pp. 73]. A prominent notion, as we see here, of most Japanese philosophy – often dismissed as some phantasmic act of satori or mystic art – is the collapsation of mind-body duality in accordance with one self-realizing entity. Basho is precisely this place from which the hyōgen sayō can be exercised freely, via mediated experiences of the self (or mind) as the world (or body). If we now return to our previous example, as I expounded through Japanese semantics earlier, we can see why the reflective nature of self is important for an overall, mediated process of knowing both the self and other. We actively – as through hyōgen sayō – in assuming the wants of another seek to know the other’s self-expressed desire within; rather than simply assuming them under some I think, I am logical framework.  The (I think) in the (I think) she is wanting an apple is hardly ever exuded in both English and Japanese alike. Nonetheless it is au fond inferred by our expressive activity, to know their knowing and not assume the fact of their self-identity; and most importantly, it is not pursued via reference to the transcendent.

Nishida in offering the basho as the grounds from which peoples reflexively willing will, provides an ardent logical framework for the possibility of individual selves; not as particular vectors, but as absolute ones irr-referentially determined by the monadic world. To this extent perhaps some would read him as far too religious, in a pious sense; or perhaps as a Spizonist wanting to mend the paradoxical world through substance. I do not see either as such, but rather see his brilliance through the semantics themselves. It has been made clear throughout the entirety of this endeavor that language has played a critical role in formulating our arguments; and it is what implicitly sits at the feet of the hyōgen sayō. For language is at best the objective means – ie., as speech, written word, signs, etc. – through which the self is intuited and through which the world is itself crafted. Through our own words and through the words of the world, a reflexive process is always at work – wherein speech enters the ear and proceeds through the lips of the other. There is, for the Kantian defender of the moral self, no such redemptive process of the whole of communication; should god and reason continue to operate above the clouds of our own visibility. They must always refer to themselves above us, or below us, should we try to do the same. There are, rather, in this historical place the others who we surround ourselves with and the water we can peer unabridged upon that allow one – at all times – to see their own self. The world, I hope to have illuminated here, is your mirror. And you, in turn, are hers. 

Notes

aKant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1998.

bKant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Lara Denis. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, The Broadview Press, Canada, 2005.

cNishida, Kitarō. Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, Last Writings. Translated with an introduction by David A. Dilworth, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987.

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