Bad Subjects

Trinity College Philosophy Journal

Paisley Blues: The Doors and the Magic of “L.A. Woman”

Whether you know Jim Morrison as someone your grandmother had a crush on when she was in high school or you’re an avid enjoyer of 60s rock and roll, The Doors are a band you probably grew up listening to or, at the very least, your dad did.

The Doors were formed in 1965 in Los Angeles, California, by keyboardist Ray Manzarek, guitarist Robby Krieger, drummer John Densmore, and, of course, magnetic frontman Jim Morrison. Manzarek and Morrison had gone to UCLA together, and after a chance encounter, Morrison decided to join Manzarek’s rather unremarkable band, Rick and The Ravens. After Manzarek’s brothers (Rick and, ironically enough, Jim) left the group and Densmore and Krieger joined, the band became known as The Doors, and music would never be the same.

The band quickly gained attention for their unique sound. It predominately featured rock, blues, and psychedelic influences, although elements of spoken word and raga rock are also scattered throughout their discography. Alongside Morrison’s poetic lyrics and rather provocative stage presence, this uniqueness would catapult them into the stratosphere.

In 1966, The Doors became the house band at the esteemed Whisky a Go Go. Here, Morrison would develop more of his poetic and improvisational tendencies, and also supported Van Morrison’s group Them, which resulted in The Doors’ rather famous rendition of  “Gloria”. They would also get fired around four months after they were hired for Morrison’s rather… profanity-laden recollection of the Oedipus myth. Nevertheless, it was at the Whisky where they met Elektra Records president Jac Holzman, as well as producer Paul A. Rothchild. The two decided to sign the band, and history was forever changed.

Signing with Elektra meant that they were introduced to their longtime engineer, Bruce Botnick. Botnick, Rothchild, and The Doors worked together to create their self-titled debut album. Released in 1967, it featured the hit single “Light My Fire,” which catapulted them to international fame. The Doors’ music often explored themes of love, death, and existentialism, establishing them as a prominent voice in the countercultural movement of the 1960s. Their next two albums, Strange Days and Waiting for the Sun,  further solidified their status, showcasing Morrison’s evolving lyrical complexity and the band’s innovative sound.

However, the late 1960s were marked by increasing turmoil. Morrison’s erratic behavior, fueled by substance abuse and a growing dissatisfaction with his image, began to affect the band’s dynamics. The 1969 album The Soft Parade faced mixed reviews, but most were negative. Morrison’s infamous “Miami Incident” also occurred in March of that year, which intensified scrutiny of his persona and the band’s reputation.

By the time the band entered the studio to record L.A. Woman in 1970, they faced a mixture of renewed creative energy and personal strife. With Rothchild departing in a fit of rage over “Love Her Madly”, the band opted to U-turn back to their blues roots. This period marked a pivotal transition for Morrison and The Doors, as they sought to redefine their sound and identity amid the pressures of fame and the changing musical landscape. L.A. Woman, released in April 1971, would be Morrison’s last album with The Doors before his untimely death in July of that year.

As one of the most iconic figures of 60s counterculture, Jim Morrison embodies the complexities of fame, artistry, and the never ending search for identity. With his alluring stage presence and poetic sensibilities, Morrison helped lead The Doors to commercial success. He did so, however, while in a harrowing battle with the burdens of celebrity. By late 1970, Morrison found himself at a crossroads, haunted by the repercussions of the “Miami Incident” and the weight of public expectation. The intertwining of Morrison’s literary ambitions and his tumultuous personal life would shape the sound and spirit of L.A. Woman. 

Before The Doors went into the studio for what should have been their final album, their biggest concern was Jim Morrison’s reputation. Jim Morrison was always a figure above fame in the sense that he seemed to be over all of it as soon as it hit him. However, in late 1970, when L.A. Woman was a seed just beginning to germinate in The Doors’ minds, the cult of Jim Morrison was unavoidable, and there was nowhere to hide for its reluctant leader.

The biggest part of this inescapable fame and reputation problem was the so-called “Miami Incident”. On March 1, 1969, The Doors performed at Dinner Key Auditorium, a 14,000-person venue that had formerly been an aeroplane hangar. This concert would turn out to be a direct reflection of the rather tumultuous relationship that existed between rock, celebrity, and public morality in the 1960s and 70s.

Morrison had recently seen an immersive theatre group called “The Living Theater”. He constantly sought new ways to push the bounds of what it meant to be a rock musician and performer, and he saw the fourth wall breaks employed by members of “The Living Theater” as his newest vessel in this quest for innovation. Morrison sought to break down the barriers between performer and audience, incorporating elements of shock and spontaneity into his act. He was smart, and he knew how to use his sexuality to his advantage. According to Doors keyboardist Ray Manzarek, who was (obviously) there, Morrison lifted his shirt (to which the crowd went wild) and asked if they wanted to see more. According to Manzarek, the crowd did want to see some more, but Morrison never actually pulled his penis out. Speaking to NPR in 1998, Manzarek said: 

“They hallucinated. I swear, the guy never did it. He never whipped it out. It was one of those mass hallucinations. I don’t want to say the vision of Lourdes, because only Bernadette saw that, but it was one of those religious hallucinations, except it was Dionysus bringing forth, calling forth snakes” (NPR 2010).

This statement reflects not only the chaotic energy of the performance but also the cult-like reverence in which Morrison was held. Similar to how Syd Barret of Pink Floyd was hailed by some as a sort of psychedelic messiah, Morrison was seen by many a hippie as the second coming of Dionysus, the Greek god of pleasure and insanity (Hansen). 

Despite the varying accounts of what actually transpired that night, the repercussions were severe. According to many of the attendees at the notorious Miami show, Morrison never actually exposed himself that night. This sentiment was later echoed by Florida’s clemency board, which exonerated him in 2010 due to insufficient evidence (NPR 2010). Nevertheless, on September 20th, 1970, after a month-long trial, Morrison was convicted of indecent exposure and profanity and sentenced to six months in prison.

Understandably, the whole ordeal took quite a toll on Morrison, Prone to the kind of existential depression that often afflicts deeply creative individuals, he found himself increasingly isolated and distressed. He managed to post bail (a cool $60,000), and his lawyers filed an appeal, but the whole ordeal made Morrison’s mental state exponentially worse.  The very fame that once empowered him began to suffocate him. 

The deaths of Jimi Hendrix and Janis Joplin in September and October, respectively, only added fuel to the flames. It would be quite a while before the notorious “27 Club” was established, but Hendrix and Joplin were Morrison’s countercultural brothers in arms, and he took their deaths rather hard. 

Adding to this emotional turmoil were the tragic deaths of fellow rock icons Jimi Hendrix and Janis Joplin in September and October 1970, respectively. These losses struck a personal chord for Morrison, who viewed Hendrix and Joplin as kindred spirits within the counterculture movement. Their untimely deaths intensified his feelings of isolation and despair, as he grappled with the idea that the lifestyle they shared could lead to a similar fate. This period marked a significant shift for Morrison. he was no longer Jim Morrison the singer, he was a symbol of the perilous nature of fame and the darker side of the 1960s.

Jim’s lawyers decided to take his case to trial rather than accept a plea deal because they saw the charges as a violation of his free speech. This was the era of events like Ken Kesey’s Acid Tests and The Rolling Stones’ Redlands bust, as well as the era of the Chicago Seven and the May ‘68 riots in Paris. All around the world, the rioting, strung-out hippie youth were at the forefront of people’s minds. 

The Miami Incident became a pivotal moment in Morrison’s life and in the legacy of the Doors. Frankly, it didn’t matter if it happened or not. The mere suggestion of blatant sexuality was enough to have American law enforcement up in arms. It highlighted the intersection of artistic expression and social politics, as well as encapsulating the fragile balance between Morrison’s desire for authenticity and the overwhelming expectations placed upon him by the general public.

Jim was no longer the drop-dead gorgeous “Young Lion” he was when he burst onto the scene in 1967. He had grown a beard and was starting to put on a little weight. This would have been perfectly unremarkable had he not been pigeonholed as a mere sex symbol since “Light My Fire” first came on the radio. After the resounding (critical) failure of The Soft Parade, Morrison and, more broadly, The Doors lost their icon status. 

By the time the L.A. Woman sessions rolled around, their reputation had been somewhat re-established with the successes of Morrison Hotel and Absolutely Live. Nevertheless, it wasn’t what it once was, and Jim was still depressed. He was rather irked by the way the press and public viewed him, feeling like the public was blaming him for the loss of the “sex icon” status that he never wanted in the first place. 

There was no doubt in anyone’s mind that Jim Morrison enjoyed being a musician, yet he regarded himself as a poet first and foremost. His passion for poetry was a driving force in his life, shaping both his lyrics and his overall artistic vision. In 1968, Morrison signed a deal with Simon & Schuster. This marked a significant step in his ambition to establish himself in the literary world. Despite this formal recognition, however, he felt perpetually sidelined as a poet. The two collections he published, The Lords and the New Creatures and An American Prayer, reflected his deep literary aspirations but didn’t come to fruition in his lifetime. The Lords and the New Creatures was published three months after his death, and An American Prayer wasn’t released until 1978.

Morrison’s frustration stemmed from the stark contrast between his burgeoning musical fame and his literary ambitions. While music offered visibility and a wide audience, it also confined him to a particular persona, that of the aforementioned “Young Lion”. This was a role he both embraced and resisted; Morrison reveled in the thrill of performance yet felt suffocated by the expectations that came with it. Public perception of Morrison as a sex symbol and wild child overshadowed his desire to be remembered as James Douglas Morrison, the multifaceted poet and singer.

While music allows for profound expression, it often lacks the same gravitas associated with literary achievement. This harsh reality left Morrison yearning for validation in the literary world, as he sought to bridge the gap between his musical and poetic aspirations. He envisioned a legacy where he would be acknowledged for his poetry, both musical and not.

In the years following his death, Morrison’s status has evolved. He is increasingly recognized not just as a rock icon, but as a literary figure in his own right. Today, he is often regarded as the poet laureate of blues rock, akin to how Patti Smith and John Cooper Clarke are celebrated in punk. 

While his music achieved immediate commercial success, his writing didn’t. This, combined with the legal and social strife at the end of the 60s, put Morrison in the mood to sing the blues. As their contract with Elektra Records required that they put out at least one more album under the label, a blues album was the perfect choice. In their early days at the Whisky through their first album, The Doors were a definitive blues band. When the band started to gain traction and Morrison was pushed into a sort of acid-shaman status by the press, they leaned into the role they were assumed to occupy. The influence of Morrison’s became more blatant. Despite this, the blues never went anywhere, they were just simmering below the surface. L.A. Woman was a return to form for the band from Venice. 

Given that it had been more than five years since the sessions for their first album, not everything remained the same. Longtime Doors producer Paul A. Rothchild left the project early on in the session. Not only had he been getting increasingly frustrated with The Doors’ rather… offbeat way of doing things, he had also just produced Janis Joplin’s solo album Pearl. Rothchild had a wonderful time working with Joplin, and for him, The Doors being back in the studio was like returning to a dead-end job after the best weekend of your life, nevermind the fact that Rothchild was, like most of the music industry, reeling from Joplin’s sudden death. The Doors were also generally more downbeat than Joplin, and the change in environment proved to be a bit too much for Rothchild. When he left the project, Rothchild recommended that The Doors self-produce in conjunction with longtime engineer Bruce Botnick. This could quite possibly be the best piece of advice the band ever received.

Botnick had been engineering for the band since their debut album came out in early 1967. He was an accomplished engineer, having worked on a few Lonnie Mack albums as well as assistant engineering The Rolling Stones’ Let It Bleed. L.A. Woman was his first real project as a producer, however. This didn’t change the quality of the music, as he was co-producing with the band, and knew them like the back of his hand. If anything, having a producer with less experience gave The Doors the push they needed to reignite their spark, both creatively and with each other. 

After Rothchild departed, the band had no choice but to work together. Their contract with Elektra stipulated that they produce six studio albums, and this was their sixth, as Absolutely Live and 13 didn’t count. In the studio, there was a sense of urgency and necessity. The album simply had to be done, and it had to be good. The Elektra contract being up created a sense of uncertainty among the band. Both Morrison’s writing career and his film career were really starting to take off, and he seemed to be going in a different direction. It wasn’t that he resented being a musician, but Morrison was simply growing up, both intellectually and artistically. It was a matter of circumstances and transitionary periods in their lives that caused The Doors to be in this state, and it was conducive to what many say is the greatest album of their career.

The entirety of L.A. Woman has a sort of magical quality to it that makes the album stick with you from the first time you hear it ‘til the moment you die. There are so many incredible qualities of it, from the record’s rich history to the production techniques, to the unfathomable events that preceded it, but the real magic of the record lies in the meat of it: the songs.

The Changeling:

L.A. Woman opens with “The Changeling”, a gritty, powerful song about exactly what you’d think from the title. As explained previously, in late 1970, when.   L.A. Woman was being written and recorded, Morrison in particular was undergoing a period of intense change. The trials and tribulations (no pun intended) of life were hitting him hard, and he felt as if he had no other option but to leave. The line “But I never been so broke that I couldn’t leave town” is mostly figurative, but it’s also a blatant foreshadowing of the last few months of Morrison’s life.

In March 1971, Morrison left L.A. for Paris. Around a month later, L.A. Woman was released, to immediate success. In some ways, The Doors as the public knew them were back. After the moderate successes of the band’s two previous releases and the smash hit that was this album, Jim Morrison and, by association, The Doors, were no longer seen as hedonists who maybe had a few good songs to their name. Once again, they were a rock and roll force to be reckoned with. Morrison had the platform he needed to go far in his artistic pursuits, musically, poetically, and whatever else. He had the world at his fingertips. Instead of grabbing life by the horns, he left it in a Paris bathtub on 3 July 1971. 

Patricia Kennealy-Morrison, who Jim married in a Celtic Pagan ceremony (although the two didn’t spend much time together after that) was quoted as saying:

“People weren’t really willing to let him grow- they wanted him to be this icon forever” (Crisafulli 126) 

The bones for “The Changeling” were written a few years earlier, and seem to be a direct response to Jim’s arrest. By the time “The Changeling” was updated and recorded, Jim Morrison was something of a shattered porcelain doll held together with scotch tape. Nevertheless, the song is full of vibrant, renewed energy. For L.A. Woman, The Doors employed Jerry Scheff on bass, who played with Elvis’ backing band at the time. Scheff gelled with the band incredibly well, but his chemistry with Krieger is front and center here. Krieger’s tone almost sounds like the horn section of a James Brown tune, but he and Scheff play off of one another like they’ve been playing together all their lives. Densmore and Scheff’s groove propels the song along like an old, reliable station wagon, fuelled by Krieger’s Gibson SG (Equipboard.com). On the bridge parts of the song, his wah pedal is especially prominent, allowing his guitar to simultaneously evoke the sounds of a brass band and the Hammond organ that Manzarek plays. 

As for the Lizard King himself, Morrison approaches this song with exhilarating energy, a stark contrast to the lyrics that foreshadowed his untimely death. Chuck Crisafulli, author of When The Music’s Over, describes Morrison’s vocals on this album as a “powerful rock’n’roll instrument,” and I can’t help but agree. With the exception of “Roadhouse Blues”, “The Changeling” feels like the first time in a long while that we get to see Morrison exhibit his vocal chops in all their screaming glory. 

“The Changeling” serves as both a reflection of Morrison’s esoteric turbulence and a roaring statement of rebirth for The Doors as a whole. Despite the many struggles that were weighing on Morrison’s psyche, the song crackles with vibrant energy, showing a side of the frontman we hadn’t heard in years. His commanding vocals, full of raw intensity, contrast sharply with the darker, more introspective themes in the lyrics. The band’s renewed chemistry propels the track forward with a groove that feels both urgent and liberated. “The Changeling” encapsulates the duality of The Doors’ trajectory: artists on the verge of monumental stardom, yet doomed to slip away.

Love Her Madly:

Directly after “The Changeling” on the album is “Love Her Madly”, a song whose reception perfectly encapsulates Robby Krieger’s role in The Doors. In the midst of all of Morrison’s, for lack of a better word, madness, Krieger worked some of his songwriting magic on a tune that would put The Doors back on the pop charts. Whether you believe in magic or not, “Love Her Madly” climbed the pop charts all the way to #11. The band took this as an immense achievement, especially given their reviews over the past two years.

L.A. Woman as a whole was a return to form for the band, but it’s “Love Her Madly” in particular that cements this. While Morrison was a rock and roll poet and the unwitting yet unarguable face of the band, it was Krieger who was their hitmaker, writing songs like “Light my Fire” and “Love Me Two Times”. Both were wonderful songwriters, but Morrison penned the more introspective, experimental, and mystical tracks. Krieger was a calmer presence in the studio (in general, really) and his songs reflect that; they’re calmer and not as risky. This made them more commercially successful, but it’d be incorrect to argue that they’re better songs overall. 

Paul Rothchild hated “Love Her Madly”, saying it sounded like “cocktail music” (Crisafulli 127). This scathing review is often misattributed as being about “Riders on the Storm”, but Rothchild confirmed in a 1981 interview with BAM that Krieger’s contribution to the album was his last straw. In the same interview, Rothchild can be quoted as saying:

“That’s the song that drove me out of the studio. That it sold a million copies means nothing to me.”

Rothchild’s tastes aside, “Love Her Madly” does have quite an interesting hook. Like the bulk of Krieger’s compositions, it’s about a pair of lovers. However, in this song, the perspective shifts a bit. The lyrics aren’t a conversation between lovers, rather, they’re Robby giving advice to a friend or peer as the friend’s relationship is falling apart. Rather than commiserating with the friend about the end of the relationship, offering a bit of anger, or really any other emotion. He takes to the situation like a complete pacifist, exhibiting a total “whatever, man” outlook on things. It’s the spirit of the 60s, really, the whole emotional pacifism, “just brush it off” sort of thing. It does make for a rather strange love song, though. 

That’s just the nature of a Doors “pop” song. There’s no Doors tune that’s going to be trivial and casual, I simply don’t believe they’re capable of it. “Love Her Madly”, may be a Top 20 single, but it still has that psychedelic-bluesy feel to it that The Doors are so known for.

Brushing the song off as a mere commercial success does it a massive disservice. The Doors can’t be shoved into one genre. Calling “Love Her Madly” acid rock is about as close as you’ll get, but the term implies a sort of niche that the track transcends. The term “blues rock” is also quite close, but the song still has psychedelic elements to it. The subtle tension that the blend of drum and guitar at the beginning creates a sort of covert sense of altered reality. It’s subtle enough to fly under the radar for the most part, but just loud enough to subvert one’s sense of what popular music should look like.

While “Love Her Madly” is more consumable than most of Morrison’s compositions for the band (“The End” and “When The Music’s Over” are a few that come to mind), The Doors’ unique sense of space and texture in their music gives even their poppiest songs a certain mystical, psychedelic edge. 

In conclusion, Krieger’s greatest contribution to L.A Woman subverts 60s pop by blending a passive approach to love and strife with a minimalist, bluesy arrangement, modal harmony, and a laid-back, psychedelic groove.

Been Down So Long:

Up next on L.A. Woman is “Been Down So Long”, a hard, gritty track that demonstrates both Morrison’s prowess as a bluesman and the expanses of his literary mind. The phrase “been down so long” is rather popular in the world of blues, but the title is borrowed from A 1966 novel called Been Down So Long it Looks Like Up to Me.  Speaking to Jeff Weiss of L.A. Weekly in 2012, Manzarek said of the theme of the song:

“[Morrison] took the title of a Richard Fariña novel. It’s another retrospectively prophetic song. He was tired and worn out. He needed to be in a quieter, calmer place” (Weiss).

Fariña’s novel tells the story of Gnossos Pappadopoulis, a Beatnik 60s college student who navigates a chaotic world of hedonism, existential confusion, and disillusionment. Through Gnossos’s disjointed, episodic journey, Fariña attempts to capture the disillusionment of a generation caught between the hope of social change and the sheer depression that preceded them. The novel is both a critique of the counterculture and a reflection on the elusive nature of happiness and fulfillment.

I didn’t like the novel too much; it felt like a forced rewrite of Jack Kerouac’s On The Road, but with more pro-hippie themes. Morrison, however, loved it; the novel was on his unofficial list of books that he’d recommend to friends when asked. “Been Down So Long” (the song) bears little resemblance to Fariña’s novel thematically; the book is more of a symbol of Morrison’s general mental state at the time. The two also share another eerie similarity: both died shortly after some of their strongest work was released. In Fariña’s case, it was only two days after the release of Been Down So Long It Looks Like Up to Me, and in Morrison’s case, it was less than three months after the release of L.A. Woman. 

“Been Down So Long” appears to be highly influenced by Furry Lewis’ 1927 track “I Will Turn Your Money Green”. Lewis was one of the only 20s bluesmen to receive a good deal of media coverage in the 60s and 70s, and Morrison was highly interested in the blues as it was.

This interest is abundantly clear in the song. Structurally, it’s a gritty, but typical, bone-rattling blues number. The first verse is a statement of a general blue sentiment in Morrison’s life. He’s been feeling low for so long that it’s become his new normal; he doesn’t know how to experience happiness. The second verse is also something you see quite frequently in blues lyrics: a statement to some sort of warden for freedom. This is also a direct reflection of Morrison’s life, given his multiple arrests and prison sentence. The third plea is also common in Morrison’s lyrics but a bit more raunchy. The verse starts with the lyrics “Baby, baby, baby/ Won’t you get down on your knees,” it’s a blatant plea for oral sex. After that, there’s a reprise of that bluesy sentiment we heard at the beginning, and the song is over. 

Musically, the song is both a return to 1967-era Doors techniques and an innovative blend of new ideas, much like L.A. Woman as a whole. The majority of the album was cut live with few overdubs, which provided the band with the intimate atmosphere they needed to remember who they truly were. Employing session guitarist Marc Benno was a great decision on the band’s part for a multitude of reasons, but on this track in particular the interplay between Benno and Krieger infuses the song with a vibrancy you’d think would detract from the bluesiness of it all, but it doesn’t. Scheff’s staccato bass line grabs the listener by the hips and forces them to listen to what the other members have to say (or play). It’s punchy, it’s direct, it has the sort of in-your-face feel to it that makes the fact that punks like Iggy Pop drew influence from The Doors make perfect sense. 

One of the surprising facts about “Been Down So Long” being a Doors track is that there isn’t a keyboard to be found on the whole four-and-a-half-ish minutes of the thing (depending on what version you’re listening to). This doesn’t necessarily mean that Manzarek was absent from the recording of this song, though. There seems to be an additional rhythm guitar around the third verse, although this remains unconfirmed. 

Cars Hiss By My Window:

Fourth on the tracklist is “Cars Hiss By My Window”, another predominately blues tune in a similar style to “Been Down So Long”. The song was developed out of material from some of Morrison’s old Venice notebooks, where a great deal of his poetry was born. A few other songs on L.A. Woman originated from these notebooks, most notably, “The Changeling”, “L’America”, and “The Wasp”.

Like so much of this album, “Cars Hiss By My Window” feels like a homecoming for the band. While most of the album is a return to the blues, this song feels different. Don’t get me wrong, “Cars Hiss By My Window” is, definitively, a blues song. It has a different feel to it, however. The song feels like the tail end of a night of heavy drinking; disorienting yet serene in a way, like you’re still physically affected but your brain is returning to normal. It feels warm and intimate, like the comfort of a good whiskey with a good group of friends. “One doesn’t often get the sense that The Doors were the kind of band given to back-porch jams, but that is exactly the feel of ‘Cars Hiss By My Window,’” writes Chuck Crisafulli of the song’s atmosphere. The intimacy of the track is a direct reflection of the camaraderie and unity the band managed to reclaim on L.A. Woman. 

This song, especially when compared to its predecessor on the album, echoes Friedrich Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian theories of art (Chaliakopoulos). These describe two fundamental artistic drives in human nature; the Apollonian represents order, reason, and rationality, and the Dionysian embodying chaos, passion, and instinct, focusing on unity, ecstasy, and the dissolution of boundaries. Nietzsche argues that great art arises from the tension and balance between these two forces, where the Apollonian provides form and the Dionysian infuses life and depth.

Morrison walked this line quite well, but the majority of his compositions skew more Dionysian. There are a few notable exceptions, “Indian Summer”, “End Of The Night”, and “Hyacinth House” being a few of them. “Cars Hiss By My Window” is a perfect example of a predominately Apollonian song with a Dionysian edge. In psychedelia, Apollonian music is spacey, blissed-out, more of the flower power, free love themes we see in a lot of the more mainstream psychedelic pop of the era. In contrast, Dionysian psychedelia is edgier, swampier, more like a bad trip or a fall into the den of the Lizard King. 

Although Morrison had read quite a bit of Nietzsche, this categorisation was almost definitely unintentional on The Doors’ part; Nietzsche’s theories are more so useful for placing music in a broader cultural context.

Crisafully was completely right when he said that “Cars Hiss By My Window” felt like a porch jam. Krieger and Benno sound sleepy and a bit lazy- not in a negative way, per se, just in the sense that they sound like they’re a bit stoned playing the tail end of a late-night jam session and they’re ready to go to bed. Densmore’s use of the brush technique on the drums and Scheff’s muddy-sounding bass give the song the swampy, perhaps-a-bit-Dionysian undertone that it needs to give it just a bit of classic Doors edge. 

While Morrison’s singing may be more relaxed on this track (with the exception of his faux harmonica solo a little past three minutes in), his lyrics are full of that good-old Jim Morrison enigmatic doom. He’s got a girl, yeah, but she’s “out of reach,”. By the end of the track, the girl is about to kill him in a darkened room. 

To sum it all up, “Cars Hiss By My Window” embodies a uniquely “Doors” blend of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, capturing both the order and intimacy of a band of friends while infusing it with the raw chaos that defines much of Morrison’s work. The song’s laid-back atmosphere reflects the band’s reclaimed unity on L.A. Woman, yet its lyrical darkness and swampy undertones maintain the haunting edge of the band. Through this track, the band successfully balances the serene and the disorienting, creating an oasis in the tension between order and chaos.

L.A Woman:

There have been quite a few songs written about the city Morrison famously refers to as the “City of Night”, but few capture the city’s deep, nuanced complexities quite like “L.A. Woman”. 

It’s rather fitting that the album is named after the song; many critics call “L.A. Woman” the strongest track on the album and I wouldn’t disagree. It’s also perfectly placed as the last track on Side A. The song is a roaring, unforgettable goodbye to Morrison’s adoptive hometown, but it’s also a bridge to a new beginning. The mentions of the “City of Light”, or Paris, refer quite clearly to the city that Morrison left Los Angeles for. Furthermore, the fact that Morrison chooses to essentially bookend the song with the same verse about “just [getting] into town an hour ago,” points to some sort of rebirth. 

Speaking of bookends, the song also gave The Doors their second-ever (and last) billboard on the Sunset Strip. As Densmore explains in his 1991 autobiography, the first billboard faced toward the sunrise, and the last faced west, towards the setting sun.

As much as “L.A. Woman” seems to chronicle Morrison’s life as a newcomer in L.A to… newcomer in Paris, the song doesn’t seem to be addressed to a single person, Morrison, the mythical L.A woman, or otherwise. Rather, it appears to be something of a goodbye letter to the city itself. This “L.A. Woman” is the city; her hair is its hills, and she seems to bring nothing but motel, money, murder, and madness. The L.A. Woman isn’t real, but an image of her does exist on the inner sleeve of the record: a young woman crucified on a telephone pole. 

Morrison, ever the bookworm, borrowed the phrase “City of Night” from a 1963 novel by author John Rechy. Although the two works are thematically completely different, as Rechy’s novel is about a group of gay hustlers, Morrison seemed to take a good bit of inspiration from Rechy, who uses the phrase “lost angels” to describe the characters in his novel. 

The song loosely follows a verse/chorus format, structured as:

-Intro

-Verse

-Chorus

-Verse

-Extended Bridge

-Verse

-Chorus

-Outro

Perhaps the most captivating section of the song lies in the middle, with the extended bridge. This is the famed “Mr Mojo Risin” section, where Morrison manages to turn an anagram for his name into an infamous innuendo. Later, in typical Morrison fashion, he joked about using the phrase as an identifier if he ever chose to disappear into Africa like his literary hero Arthur Rimbaud.

In conclusion, “L.A. Woman” is a bittersweet farewell to Los Angeles and a bridge to a new, Parisian chapter. The song’s layered lyrics, hypnotic structure, and iconic “Mr. Mojo Risin’” bridge create a powerful blend of personal reflection and mythic imagery. By invoking the “City of Night” and blending personal, literary, and cultural references, Morrison crafts a farewell that is equal parts goodbye and rebirth, making the track a fitting, unforgettable conclusion to Side A of the album and a lasting, pivotal moment in The Doors’ discography.

L’America

Robby Krieger’s haunting, dripping guitar kicks off Side B of L.A. Woman. “L’America” is trippy in all senses of the word, originally intended for the soundtrack of Zabriskie Point. Director Michaelangelo Antonioni had just done Blow Up, a 1966 film that follows a London fashion photographer, who unknowingly captures a potential murder in a series of photos. As he enlarges the images, he becomes obsessed with uncovering the truth, but the more he investigates, the more unclear and surreal the situation becomes. The film explores themes of reality and ambiguity, and the mystery still isn’t resolved by the end of the film. 

The surrealist nature of Antonioni’s work made The Doors a perfect fit for the soundtrack to his next film, 1970’s Zabriskie Point, a film that follows a disillusioned L.A. college student who wanders through a desert mostly aimlessly after escaping a violent protest at his school. All signs point to a Doors feature brought right at home on the soundtrack, but Antonioni wasn’t a huge fan when he heard a run-through at the Doors Workshop (their practice space), and declined to use it in the film. This wasn’t a huge upset for the band as the film was a box-office bomb and critically panned upon its release, but it’s since grown a cult-like following among film and psychedelia enthusiasts. I quite like the film, but it does have that child-of-the-60s sort of forced profundity to it. 

“L’America” is a rather fascinating tune, even if it is a bit out of place on L.A. Woman. While the rest of the album is a blues project with a touch of paisley to it, “L’America” is pure Dionysian psychedelia with a few bluesy free-for-alls mixed in. The song doesn’t quite stick out like a sore thumb, but it sounds like it belongs on Waiting for the Sun or The Celebration of the Lizard rather than L.A. Woman. This uniqueness makes sense though, given that the song was practically finished a year and a half before L.A. Woman was released. The song was also strange in the studio; it was the result of a fair few studio sessions as opposed to being cut live in three or four takes.

Bill Siddons, the band’s manager, said of the taxing studio sessions “I remember walking on when they were doing ‘L’America’ and they were on something like take 33. I think that squeezed all the emotion out of the song” (Crisafulli 132). Siddons’ statement is rather general, but he does have somewhat of a point. There is quite a bit of emotion on the track, but it’s not the guttural, raw blues that we’re used to seeing on the rest of L.A. Woman. The song feels more like acid-induced mania rather than a liquored depression.

According to Morrison, the title is an abbreviation of Latin America, as the song is meant to reflect a rather odd trip south of the border. He also engages in some remarkably cheeky wordplay with the lines “Change the weather, change your luck/ And then he’ll teach you how to… find yourself”.

The song abandons any sort of standard blues progression, instead going for the dark and winding, psychedelic nightmare vibe that it holds. Krieger’s tone gives his playing a sound not unlike molten wax dripping onto a burning wooden cross, and his Scheff-backed, descent-into-madness riff creates a doomy atmosphere that would have made it perfect for a Zabriskie Point-esque film. What makes Antonioni’s rejection of the song rather ironic is the fact that it was a film, 1979’s Apocalypse Now, that would reignite public interest in The Doors after their death.

Hyacinth House:

“Hyacinth House”, which directly succeeds “L’America” is another semi-anomaly on the band’s so-called blues album. Morrison was an undeniably beautiful person and an incredibly talented poet and singer, but there isn’t a lot of his work that one would call beautiful. It’s often raw, sensual, liquored, gritty, and hypnotic, but beauty isn’t often used to describe his compositions. However, “Hyacinth House” is an all-around beautiful song, a flowing, somber ballad that’s still quintessentially Jim Morrison.

Morrison’s lyrics are once again packed with layers and layers of meaning. The physical “Hyacinth House” is most likely The Continental Hyatt House (as it was then known), a Sunset-Strip hotel infamous for hosting touring rock bands and all the rock n’ roll debauchery they got up to once they stepped off stage. The song’s lyrics also directly reflect the Greek myth of Hyacinthus. It’s rather fitting that a bookworm and “second coming of Dionysius” would write a song about Greek mythology. 

The myth of Hyacinthus centers around a beautiful young prince of Sparta, beloved by both Apollo and Zephyrus, the god of spring and the west wind. One day, while playing a game of discus with Apollo, the god of sunlight, music, and poetry (amongst other things) mistakenly struck Hyacinthus in the head, which killed the young prince. In his grief, Apollo transformed Hyacinthus’ blood into a flower (the hyacinth) to immortalize his beauty and sorrow. The myth reflects themes of love, loss, and the transformative power of grief (Theoi.com). 

In Morrison’s interpretation of the myth, the grief is not for another person, but for the beautiful Young Lion he once was. I’m not one to subscribe to the idea that beauty fades with age, but Morrison was no longer regarded by the general public as a beautiful young rock icon, but a haggard, shaggy man. As aforementioned, Morrison was rather uncomfortable with all of this fame and assigned sex-icon status, but in many ways, he had grown used to it. Having that designation ripped away once he gained some weight and grew a beard (and got arrested) was a stark change that he struggled to make sense of. So, in typical Morrison fashion, the Lizard King turned to song.

The only line in the song that doesn’t subscribe to these explanations is the line “I know the bathroom is clear”. It probably has a more cryptic meaning, knowing Morrison, but there is a more literal one: the bathroom at the Doors Workshop was often used as an echo chamber that Morrison would rehearse in before takes.

As for the instrumentation of the song, Krieger and Manzarek’s guitar and keyboard sounds, respectively, are unusually but not uncharacteristically pretty, just like Morrison’s lyrics. The instrumentation in The Doors’ “Hyacinth House” creates a haunting, introspective atmosphere that complements the song’s melancholic lyrics. Manzarek’s swirling electric organ creates a dreamy atmosphere, while Krieger’s reverb-laden guitar adds a subtle, reflective quality to the piece. John Densmore’s drumming is light and restrained, emphasising the somber mood of the song while being careful to not overpower the arrangement. Manzarek’s Piano Bass makes another appearance here, providing a deep, resonant foundation and grounding the track’s melancholy feeling. Overall, the sparse instrumentation aptly captures the introspective, otherworldly feel of the song, cementing the themes of change and longing that Morrison is singing about.

Crawling King Snake:

The Doors’ version of “Crawling King Snake” takes the foundational elements of John Lee Hooker’s blues standard and injects it with the band’s signature “paisley blues” sound.

Krieger’s guitar work is central to the track, with a relatively simple, bluesy riff that creates a hypnotic, repetitive groove, with the slightly distorted tone adding a raw, gritty edge. Jerry Scheff returns on bass, and his bassline anchors the song with a deep, pulsing foundation that reflects the track’s dark, brooding mood. Densmore’s drumming is crucial to the track, but he maintains a certain subtlety, playing a steady, laid-back beat that complements the blues rhythm while still allowing Morrison and Krieger to shine. Manzarek also contributes on the electric organ, filling in the spaces with an ambiance that adds texture and an eerie, ethereal quality to the track. The overall instrumentation is, like many other tracks on this album, sparse but perfectly arranged, with each instrument playing off the others to build tension and create a fluid, hypnotic movement. This minimalist approach feels true to the blues and enhances the song’s moody atmosphere, giving it a sort of gradual build as it progresses. The Doors, in general, blend the blues with their own psychedelic-isms, creating a distinctive, immersive sound that perfectly complements the themes of power, sensuality, and dark desire present in “Crawling King Snake”.

Seeing as Morrison intended L.A. Woman to be a “blues album”, the choice to cover an actual blues standard was a natural one. This wasn’t a new move for the band, as they had covered “Back Door Man”, a song written by blues legend Willie Dixon and popularised by Howlin’ Wolf. Covering a blues standard just made sense; in many ways, it was a return to their roots. 

The WASP:

“The WASP (Texas Radio & The Big Beat)”, is a straight Jim Morrison poem later set to music, not unlike the whole of the band’s 1978 release An American Prayer. Morrison liked to incorporate his own poetry and spoken word into his performances, and “The WASP” was often used as a lead-in to “Love Me Two Times”, released on Strange Days in 1967. “The WASP” is another song developed from Morrison’s Venice notebooks, which held rough drafts of a lot of Morrison’s poetry, written before and around when The Doors were just beginning to bloom. 

The instrumentalists created a perfect backing for Morrison’s lyrics. Densore’s drums provide a laid-back, hypnotic pulse. Coupled with Manzarek’s Hammond Organ, the two create a hypnotic, bewitching vibe. Manzarek also crafted the bassline on this tune, which is played on his signature Fender Rhodes Piano Bass. It’s got a mobile, marching feel to it that makes it feel like a sea shanty or automotive work song. Krieger’s guitar is subtle but valuable, contributing reverb-heavy riffs that weave around the organ’s melodies and add to the hypnotism of it all. Overall, the arrangement is sparse but rich. There’s a sort of controlled minimalism to it all that fosters a feeling of tension and surrealism that listeners have come to expect from the band.

The instrumentation creates an incredibly well-fitting atmosphere for a song about the radio. If you close your eyes, you can almost imagine a young Morrison in the back of his father’s station wagon, entranced by the music that he’s hearing on the car radio. That’s exactly what Morrison sought to achieve with this song- radios were a rare constant in his army brat childhood. Being the son of Navy Admiral George S. Morrison meant a whole lot of moving, primarily between California, Florida, and New Mexico. Powerful radio signals from Texas and Mexico could reach as far as Illinois and a young Morrison found comfort and a sense of home in the music on the radio. Go figure.

Like so many other artists in the 1960s, the radio was Morrison’s bridge to music cultures he never would have been exposed to otherwise as a white, middle-class kid from Melbourne, Florida. FM radio exposed Morrison to music from different countries, to blues stations, R&B, strange, offbeat rock n’ roll, and to just about anything else that could reach wherever he was living at the time. Morrison was exposed to Elvis and The Beatles like practically everyone else in his demographic, but also to artists the Top 40 could never have dreamed of. 

Despite not being commercially released until the band’s last (good) album, the poem was one of the first to become a physical piece of The Doors’ legacy; it was even included in their souvenir book from their tour in 1968. The version of the piece featured on L.A. Woman wasn’t the end of its legacy, though. Portions of “The Wasp” would go on to be featured in the “Stoned Immaculate” section of “An American Prayer”.

 “The WASP (Texas Radio & The Big Beat)” stands as a powerful example of Morrison’s ability to blend poetry with music, creating a piece that echoes the themes of alienation and discovery that permeate his work. Rooted in his early poetry, the song reflects Morrison’s thematic fascination with his transient childhood. The band’s instrumental arrangement perfectly complements Morrison’s evocative lyrics, enhancing the sense of surrealism and tension. More broadly, the song captures the essence of the countercultural relationship with media, identity, and self-expression in the 1960s. “The WASP” not only encapsulates Morrison’s artistic vision; the minimalist instrumentation provides a backbone that ensures its lasting impact, making it a timeless deep cut in The Doors’ legacy.

Riders on the Storm:

Closing out L.A. Woman is “Riders on the Storm”, a track that sticks with you from the moment your ears are graced with it for the first time. It’s probably the fact that it’s The Doors’ last song on their last album with the incomparable, infamous Jim Morrison, but there’s a distinct sense of eerie mysticism present in the song. 

The song is a crucial piece of evidence for those who believe that Morrison had been plotting his escape to Paris (and subsequent demise) for a long while. On the 2021, 50th anniversary remaster of the album, Morrison can be heard at the beginning of “Riders on the Storm” in conversation with Densmore and the rest of his band, talking about how they’re on take ten and ways of getting some “real thunder” in the song. One line from Morrison sticks out as if he wrote it in neon lights: “This is take ten. It’ll never be take ten again.”

Now I’m not of the belief that Morrison’s death was some sort of poetic suicide, or orchestrated by the CIA, or any of the other wild conspiracy theories that have cropped up over the years. As much as I love Morrison and The Doors (I have a tattoo of Morrison’s signature on my ribs), I don’t think regarding him as some sort of demigod and trying to find arbitrary meaning in his death does his legacy any good. The unfortunate reality of the circumstances of his death is that autopsies were not required by French law at the time, so we’ll never properly know how he died. At the end of the day, Jim Morrison was a tragic, beautiful soul who had a longtime drinking problem and had begun wading into heroin-infested waters. Nevertheless, Morrison did have a flair for the eerie and dramatic, and a statement lamenting the passage of time is quite on brand for him. 

Did-he-or-was-he aside, “Riders on the Storm” is an incredible song, even if you take away all of the attractive mysticism behind it. It’s songs like this that make the fact that The Doors never employed an electric bass player as a full-fledged member so shocking. Scheff’s bassline creates what Crisafulli refers to as a “pulsing drone” (Crisafulli 135). This then creates the tension in the track that the band is so known for. As magnetic as Morrison and his bandmates are together, it’s difficult to imagine L.A. Woman without Jerry Scheff. 

There are also added sound effects on the track; which some may say goes against the “return to form” of it all, but that’s not entirely true. It was a relatively new concept at the time, but tracks like “Five To One” and “Horse Latitudes” (the lead-in to “Moonlight Drive” on Strange Days) from earlier in their repertoire also used the same technique. It provides the ability to control what the listener is hearing more closely, which made sense for the band as they were co-producing. Furthermore, Manzarek’s jazzy electric piano creates an intimate, lounge sort of feel that suits the piece quite well. That’s why Rothchild’s “cocktail music” comment about “Love Her Madly” is often attributed to “Riders on the Storm”. You can almost imagine The Doors as a lounge band at an upscale nightclub here, with Morrison crooning to you after you’re a few drinks deep and your face is starting to flush. What a strange place that would be. Morrison’s vocals on the song are wistful and supernatural, almost like that of an oracle delivering some bad news. I suppose, in a way, he is. 

As uniquely Doors as “Riders on the Storm” is, the title and hook are actually pulled from a different poet- Hart Crane. Crane was known for his modernist poetry that sought to capture the complexity and energy of the American experience. Born in Ohio in 1899, Crane was deeply influenced by the imagery of the sea, urban life, and American mythology. His most famous work is “The Bridge”, a long poem that explores themes of American identity, history, and transcendence, using the Brooklyn Bridge as a symbol of connection and modernity. Crane’s poetry is known for its dense, lyrical language and vivid imagery. He struggled immensely throughout his life, namely with familial tensions and his homosexuality, ultimately committing suicide at age 32. Crane isn’t quite a household name à la Eliot and Whitman, but he’s known by many a bookworm as being highly significant to the modernist movement and to 20th-century American poetry as a whole (Crane 43-103). 

It’s unclear if Morrison was attracted to Crane’s status as a poet who died young or just liked his material, but Morrison elected to borrow the phrase “riders on the storm” from Crane’s Praise For An Urn, where he refers to advice from a deceased friend as “inheritances- delicate riders on the storm” (Crisafulli 135). Many common themes from both Crane’s poetry and Morrison’s work are present in “Riders on the Storm”. The song echoes themes of love (in this case, Morrison professing his love to longtime partner Pamela Courson), death, and fate, which are all abundant in these last seven minutes and fourteen seconds we get with Morrison, at least until An American Prayer. 

There are a fair few similarities between “Riders On The Storm” and a poem on An American Prayer called “The Hitchhiker”, actually. When the poem was set to music for the 1978 album, the remaining Doors decided to add ghostly whispers of “riders on the storm…” at the end of many lines, cementing the connection between the two pieces. Both works (“The Hitchhiker” in particular) are also quite thematically similar to HWY: An American Pastoral, Morrison’s indie film about a serial killer who lures his victims by posing as an innocent hitchhiker. 

“Riders On The Storm” was truly a last hurrah for The Doors, in all senses of the word. The song was released as a single in June 1971 and climbed its way to #14 on the Billboard charts. Coupled with the success of “Love Her Madly”, The Doors were back, but not for long. A mere three weeks later, Jim Morrison died in his partner’s apartment in Paris, and the band would never recover. 

The Doors really are in a league of their own, and L.A. Woman represents that. The album is an expert blend of blues and psychedelia, of prose and poetry, lyrics and literature. The band had a real knack for blending history with the here and now and creating something acutely, distinctly Doors. Far beyond the rich history and impressive, intelligent lyrics of L.A. Woman is the technique behind the construction of the whole thing. I sound like I’m beating a dead horse at this point, but the album really was a blend of the old and the new; an amazingly innovative return to form. This is perhaps most evident in the production techniques on the album.

As aforementioned, due to a fallout with longtime producer Paul A. Rothchild, the band self-produced the record in conjunction with engineer Bruce Botnick. Botnick is renowned for both his skills as an audio engineer and producer and is perhaps best known for his work on L.A. Woman. His role in shaping some of the essence of the record was pivotal; he was not only the engineer and producer but also (arguably) in capturing the raw energy and spontaneity of the sessions. Credit for the sonic shift of L.A. Woman goes primarily to Botnick above any other single person. His innovative techniques in the studio, particularly his use of natural reverb and live, on-the-fly mixing, helped define the album’s gritty, sprawling, yet intimate feel. His work on L.A. Woman remains a significant contribution to music history, instrumental in preserving the band’s legacy and their unfiltered approach to what we call rock and roll.

Although, by Botnick’s own admission, his experiences with the band were varied, he continues to work on their posthumous releases. As Botnick is alive and more impartial than the actual members of the band can be, he’s become somewhat of a primary source for Doors history. Speaking on fellow engineer/producer Andrew Scheps’ podcast Andrew Scheps Talks To Awesome People, Botnick shares “There was so much that Jim had to say about the direction and about the way that things needed to be” (Scheps, 2:05-2:10). Although Botnick is talking about Morrison Hotel here rather than L.A. Woman, we get a sense of Morrison’s headspace from his recollections. Morrison cared deeply about the output and success of his work. He even called Densmore from across the Atlantic, about a month before he died, to ask how the album was doing (Crisafulli 123).  He wasn’t abandoning music for the literary arts, he was simply shifting gears a bit. 

Botnick was also a perfect fit for The Doors, personality-wise. Where the band had that wild, enigmatic, artist side to them, Botnick was calm and collected. He knew how to have fun, but he also knew how to get shit done in the studio. This led to their choice to (primarily) record live, and also led to their most intimate, “together” atmosphere yet. In 21st-century interviews, it’s evident- Botnick doesn’t subscribe to the cult of celebrity that plagued Morrison. He genuinely seems to be there because he enjoys the music, something Morrison surely appreciated. 

Botnick’s production of L.A. Woman is notable for many reasons, perhaps the most important of which is its raw, live-in-studio approach. This was a departure from the more heavily overdubbed and complex arrangements of the band’s earlier albums, and seemed to fare well with listeners. Rather than relying on the studio to layer multiple tracks or manipulate the sound in post-production, the band and producer Bruce Botnick opted to capture the immediacy and energy of the group playing together in the same room. This approach gave the album a more organic, spontaneous feel, especially on tracks like “L.A. Woman” and “Cars Hiss By My Window,” where the musicians’ interactions are clearly audible. The decision to minimize editing and overdubs created a more natural, unpolished sound. This, in turn, emphasized the emotional rawness and immediacy of the performances, marking a shift toward simplicity and authenticity in their sound. L.A. Woman was the here and now, but it was also a window to the “back then”. 

Krieger’s guitar work on L.A. Woman is both prominent and innovative, contributing to the album’s distinctive sound. One of the more notable, but less talked about aspects of the album is the introduction of Marc Benno, which adds layers and texture to the tracks without overshadowing the central groove. This allowed Krieger to experiment more, one example being his use of slide guitar on “L.A. Woman.” This style of playing was a departure from his more complex guitar work on earlier albums like Strange Days and Waiting For The Sun, and its simplicity helped to ground the album in that muddy, bluesy sound they wanted. Krieger’s tone throughout the album is often earthy and direct, further enhancing the sense of authenticity and live energy. 

Manzarek’s role in the production of the album is more subtle than previous albums, but just as essential to the overall sound. While L.A. Woman is less reliant on the dense organ and keyboard textures that characterized earlier albums, his contributions are still integral to the overall mood of the songs. The electric piano on “L.A. Woman,” creates a warm, resonant tone that complements Morrison’s vocals, as well as the song’s laid-back groove. Manzarek’s Hammond organ is front and center on “The WASP”, but his keyboard work on the rest of the album is, in general, more restrained and sparse compared to the elaborate arrangements of earlier Doors albums, especially The Soft Parade. This minimalist approach helps create space within the tracks, allowing the other instruments to breathe. This also makes the album feel more open and uncluttered, adding to the intimate simplicity that Botnick and the band worked so hard to cultivate. The harmonic simplicity of Manzarek’s keyboard parts supports the groove-driven nature of the album, and his playing is in perfect harmony with the overall stripped-down production style.

Morrison’s vocal performance on L.A. Woman is another one of the album’s standout features. His delivery is both restrained and explosively emotional, and the production emphasizes the nuances of his voice much more prominently than on previous albums. Morrison’s vocals are often drenched in reverb and ever-so-subtle echo effects, which create a sense of space and depth, which in turn enhances the atmospheric quality of the songs. This production choice helps to convey the mysterious and introspective mood that permeates much of the album. On tracks like “Riders on the Storm,” the echo effects on Morrison’s voice contribute to the haunting, surreal vibe, giving it a supernatural quality that complements the song’s dark, cinematic feel. His vocal performance throughout L.A. Woman reflects a shift from the more theatrical, wild delivery of earlier works to a more controlled expression that doesn’t skimp on the intensity factor.

The production of L.A. Woman is marked by distinctive choices that enhance the atmosphere and mood of each track. Perhaps the most memorable is “Riders on the Storm,” which opens with rain and thunder sound effects that immediately set a haunting, cinematic tone. This track is probably the most innovative in terms of production. Sure, groups like Pink Floyd were experimenting with a cacophony of different sound effects, but The Doors managed to add the perfect amount for what they were trying to create. You get the sense that you’re listening to something big and important, but it’s important in the sense that it sticks in your brain like bitter nostalgia. These ambient sounds, combined with Morrison’s reverb-drenched vocals, create an eerie, dreamlike quality that fits the song’s introspective and dark themes. 

In a similar, innovative fashion, “The WASP” uses tape delay and echo effects on Morrison’s vocals to create a dramatic, expansive sound. The heavy percussion and Manzarek’s throbbing organ build a hypnotic rhythm that complements Morrison’s swinging lyrics, adding to the track’s larger-than-life feel. The echo effects and slight distortion give the song a raw, almost tribal energy.

On “L.A. Woman”, the production emphasizes a gritty, almost rootsy rock sound. The iconic guitar riff cuts through the mix with a tactile, live feel (I wonder why!), while Morrison’s commanding yet intimate vocal delivery is enhanced with subtle reverb, giving the song a spacious quality. Scheff and Densmore’s steady rhythm section, with its smooth yet firm grooves, adds a crucial momentum, driving the track forward from its open, laid-back vibe.

Across the album, these production choices- whether atmospheric, technical, or pertaining to the arrangements- help each song feel unique while maintaining a cohesive sense of mood and space. The result is an album that feels both immediate and wistfully cinematic, with each track being carefully crafted to support its emotional and sonic themes.

In my never-ending quest to get to the bottom of L.A. Woman, it became clear that the album represents both the culmination of The Doors’ musical evolution and a profound reflection of their artistic identity at a critical point in their career. L.A. Woman marked a return to the band’s roots, blending the raw energy of the blues with the complexity of psychedelia. Through its unique fusion of genres, the album serves as a bridge between the hippie music of the 1960s and the hard rock of the 1970s. It does so while simultaneously showcasing a band deeply influenced by the changing cultural and musical landscape of the world around them, through the lens of none other than the city of Los Angeles.

Through the song-by-song analysis, I was able to identify a marked shift toward a more straightforward, sexy, bluesy sound, a notable contrast to the band’s previous albums (especially the middle two). Tracks like “Cars Hiss By My Window” and “Been Down So Long” reflect a band embracing a more stripped-down, blues-oriented approach, yet they retain the genius, poetic lyricism that defined The Doors’ music. Morrison’s lyric poetry, often cryptic and visceral, evokes a sense of personal introspection and existential exploration, one that’s become more and more eerie the more we uncover about the last days of Jim Morrison. The rest of the band’s performance offers a sonic depth that complements the raw emotional power of the lyrics. This is spearheaded by the three full-fledged members of the band; Krieger’s distinctive guitar work, Manzarek’s atmospheric keyboard textures, and Densmore’s propulsive drumming all play a vital role in the makeup of the album. But Jerry Scheff and Marc Benno are instrumental to the success of the album, as well.

The production techniques on L.A. Woman further highlight the band’s streamlined yet unpolished approach to recording. The album was famously produced with a focus on capturing the energy one feels when seeing The Doors live, and the bulk of the album was cut live in just a few takes. This raw, unrefined sound contributes to the album’s timeless quality, allowing listeners over fifty years later to experience the band’s chemistry and spontaneity in ways otherwise would have been lost on us children of the twenty-first century. Additionally, the integration of Morrison’s literary influences, particularly Hart Crane and Richard Fariña, shows the band’s continued evolution and their willingness to experiment within the unforgiving field of rock and roll.

L.A. Woman is a deeply introspective and multifaceted album, offering a complex portrait of a band at the crossroads of their career. It encapsulates the spirit of the time, reflecting both the optimism and bleak disillusionment of the late 60s and early 70s. More than just the swan song of The Doors as a band, it is a testament to their ability to evolve musically while maintaining the elements that make their sound unique. The album not only stands as one of the band’s finest achievements but also as an enduring cornerstone in the history of rock. The album’s themes- identity, freedom, love, and the duality of light and darkness- continue to resonate, ensuring L.A. Woman remains a seminal and enduring work within the canon of rock and roll.

Works Cited

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Chaliakopoulos, Antonis. “What Is the Apollonian and Dionysian in Nietzsche’s Philosophy?” The Collector, 13 Jan. 2022, www.thecollector.com/nietzsche-philosophy-apollonian-dionysian/.

Cherry, Jim. The Doors Examined. Bennion Kearny, 2013.

Crane, Hart, and Marc Simon. Complete Poems of Hart Crane. Liveright, 2001.

Densmore, John. Riders on the Storm: My Life with Jim Morrison and The Doors. Delta, 1991.

“The Doors – Alabama Song (Whisky Bar).” Genius, genius.com/The-doors-alabama-song-whisky-bar-lyrics. Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

Gross, Terry. “Morrison In Miami: The Doors’ Manzarek Tells The Story.” NPR, NPR, 10 Dec. 2010, Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

Hansen, Dorian. “Beardless Dionysus in Ancient Greek and Roman Art.” Lycoming College, Lycoming College, www.lycoming.edu/humanities-research-center/mid-atlantic-humanities-review/pdfs/vol-1/8-hansen-androgynous-god.pdf. Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

“The Hitchhiker.” Jim Morrison – The Hitchhiker Lyrics | Lyrics.Com, www.lyrics.com/lyric/1020828/The+Hitchhiker. Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

“Hyakinthos.” HYACINTHUS (Hyakinthos) – Spartan Prince of Greek Mythology, www.theoi.com/Heros/Hyakinthos.html. Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

Meltzer, Robert. “L.A. Woman.” Rolling Stone, Rolling Stone, 25 June 2018, www.rollingstone.com/music/music-album-reviews/l-a-woman-252558/.

Petridis, Alexis. “It’s Only LSD but I like It: The Play Telling the Untold Story about the Stones Drugs Bust.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 17 Sept. 2024, www.theguardian.com/stage/2024/sep/17/mick-jagger-keith-richards-lsd-rolling-stones-drugs-bust-redlands-swinging.

“Rick & the Ravens Songs, Albums, Reviews, Bio …” AllMusic, www.allmusic.com/artist/rick-the-ravens-mn0001660582#biography. Accessed 30 Nov. 2024.

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Runtagh, Jordan. “Doors’ ‘L.A. Woman’: 10 Things You Didn’t Know.” Rolling Stone, Rolling Stone, 22 Sept. 2019, www.rollingstone.com/feature/doors-l-a-woman-10-things-you-didnt-know-41912/3/.

Scheps, Andrew, and Bruce Botnick. “Bruce Botnick Discuss The Doors.” Andrew Scheps Talks To Awesome People, YouTube, 19 July 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wg6FsKKqoio.

Weiss, Jeff. “L.A. Woman: Track List – LA Weekly.” L.A. Weekly, L.A. Weekly, 19 Jan. 2012, www.laweekly.com/l-a-woman-track-list/. 

Understanding suicide through the lens of Libertarianism; In what ways can suicide be interpreted as proof for the existence of free will?

by Paz Daniela Ortiz Santa María, Peruvian Social Activist and Humanities Researcher

INTRODUCTION 

Didn’t you think I knew that you were born with the power of a locomotive,  

able to leap tall buildings in a single bound? 

“For You” (1973), Bruce Springsteen. 

French philosopher Albert Camus began his essay “The Myth of Sisyphus” by stating that “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy”. When expanding upon the reasons behind his claim, Camus alludes to the real-life implications of deciding to take one’s own life, concluding that “the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions”.

Indeed, the issue of suicide constitutes one of the most intricate discussions related to the topic of human behaviour. Consequently, it has been widely examined through the lens of various disciplines, ranging from psychology to biology, from anthropology to theology, and from ethics to philosophy. Although in most of these instances suicide has been approached as nothing more than a social phenomenon, thinkers often decide to explore the metaphysical implications of an act of this nature, and what it can reveal about identity and free will. 

In metaphysics, libertarianism is the philosophical position that asserts that humans have free will. Free will can be described as “the main cause of human choices and actions. Actions are unpredictable because people are choosing from a set of options, and that choice is free. Despite some external influences, free will has the final word and can override external causes”. In support of this view, philosophers have appealed to diverse instances that allegedly stem from humans’ exercise of freedom; however, can it be argued that the voluntary termination of one’s life is one of them? 

According to Cambridge Dictionary, the noun suicide stands for “the act of killing yourself intentionally”. The word used to refer to this act is clearly distinguishable from the term that describes an unexpected or unplanned passing—that distinction being the intentional and aware pursuit of one’s death. This differentiation is present across many languages, as noted by the Austrian essayist Jean Améry, who highlights the importance of denoting intent when talking about suicide. In Améry’s native German, the term “Freitod” can be translated to “voluntary death”, which he explains is appropriate to describe the fact that “the act itself is sometimes—frequently—brought into being by a condition of urgent compulsion”.

Though initially, one might find it difficult to identify a clear connection between suicide and free will—let alone reach the conclusion that the latter’s existence is fundamentally proved by the former’s—, it takes but a close look at what killing oneself entails to realize the extent to which they are intertwined. Accepting the premise that suicide is feasible for any individual implies that human beings can be accurately described as self-aware creatures that can recognize their own mortality and voluntarily seek death. Amongst other things, it suggests that, unlike other animals, humans can challenge and ultimately overcome their biological drive to prioritize self-preservation. At the very least, the mere existence of people who have actively chosen to kill themselves defies our perception of ourselves as exclusively determined creatures. 

This essay is titled “Understanding suicide through the lens of libertarianism”, and aims to answer the question “In what ways can suicide be interpreted as proof for the existence of free will?” In this essay, a philosophical investigation of the metaphysical implications of suicide—voluntary death—will be conducted in order to evaluate how cogent it is to claim that, at its core, taking one’s own life is an exercise of free will. 

To do so, the essay will be divided into three chapters, each of which will address a different perspective on the matter: Chapter I: Through the lens of libertarianism (where the nature of actions, agency, and ownership will be studied); Chapter II: Fear of death (where biological and social determinism will be the main focus), and Chapter III: A life worth living (where it will be considered if suicide can be the result of a logical thought process). The conclusion will present the results of this exploration. 

METHODOLOGY. 

The investigation carried out to answer the Research Question focused primarily on works by philosophers who have discussed suicide from a libertarian or absurdist standpoint, amongst which “The Myth of Sisyphus” by Albert Camus and “On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death” by Jean Améry have stood out as the most influential throughout the writing process. Likewise, Thomas Szasz’s essay “The Ethics of Suicide” both challenged and supported the ideas presented in this essay. 

Similarly, extracts from three of the Romanian pessimistic philosopher Emil Cioran’s works—“Drawn and Quartered”; “On the Heights of Despair” and “The Trouble with Being Born”—were consulted to formulate the thesis that this essay is evaluating. Other primary sources that were utilized include various academic essays and journal articles related to free will, suicide, or both. Secondary sources, used for definitions and expansion of ideas, include the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 

CHAPTER I. Through the lens of libertarianism 

This chapter will attempt to define if it can be accurately claimed that humans have both agency and ownership over their own lives. To do so, Section a) will explore the nature of actions, agree upon a set of categories that aids the development of this essay, and sort voluntary death into one of them. Furthermore, Section b) will discuss different perspectives of who or what truly owns one’s life. 

a) Agency in the midst of cause-effect correlation 

According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, an agent is “a being with the capacity to act” and agency “denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity”.8 Elemental action theory sums up action by asserting that it is something an agent does that was “intentional under some description”. Within deterministic schools of thought, any human action that indicates intent is often argued to be the mere effect of a related cause, proportional in every way to it. 

These definitions allow for a wider discussion to take place regarding the nature of actions and how they can be classified. Naturally, one can conclude that all causes have effects and that every cause is, in turn, the effect of another cause—and vice versa. Nonetheless, it is reductionist to the point of fallacy to assert that all effects react to the same type of cause, which can signify an important distinction when discussing free will. For the debate at hand, the source of an event—where it originates—will be analysed as a point of reference to classify potential causes. 

If one agrees with the premise that there is a cause-effect correlation between all actions, it is appropriate to conclude that the source of a cause has an impact on the nature of the effect. It logically follows to recognize that a given cause’s source can either be external to one’s space of consciousness, or internal. In order to assure clarity in terms of philosophical terminology, the term “space of consciousness” will be used to refer to the delimited extent within which a person can have first-hand experiences. Hence, a rainy day classifies as an external-sourced cause, and a person opening an umbrella is the effect. Accordingly, a desire would classify as an internal-sourced cause and fulfilling it, its effect. 

When discussing external causes, effects can be referred to as “reactions” because they constitute a response to an external stimulus, and a strong case as to why those are inherently determined can be made with ease. However, when talking about causes that originate within one’s space of consciousness, it becomes more difficult to measure how the effect could be directly proportional to said cause, simply by the nature of every person’s inalienability from their first-hand experiences. In other words, accurately identifying cause-effect correlation becomes almost impossible when the cause is an internal phenomenon because they are often unexplainable to anyone but the person experiencing it. Thus, if the effect were to be voluntary death, and the cause could be argued to be internal, then one could not fully confirm the extent to which that was determined to happen. 

Camus’s observations on suicide are as follows: “An act like this is prepared within the silence of the heart, as is a great work of art. […] One evening he pulls the trigger or jumps”. This implies that he considers that the causes behind someone’s suicide originate within their inner selves. He goes on to comment on the origin of suicide, saying that “beginning to think is beginning to be undermined. Society has but little connection with such beginnings. The worm is in man’s heart. That is where it must be sought”. His mention of the limited—almost non-existent—role of societal factors in the decision to take one’s life speaks to a belief that suicide cannot be reduced to a mere response to external stimuli or social conditioning. 

This section allows us to conclude that agency can be identified in an action like suicide bearing in mind the nature of its cause. What follows is to discuss the ownership of life, and whether it is an individual’s to end. 

b) The nature of the ownership of life 

Having planted the seed of uncertainty in total determinism, this section asks: What can one claim to truly own? This question becomes relevant given that free will can be argued to exist only when exercised over things that one owns. Current societal structures are built upon the idea that objects—and even other people’s lives—can be rightfully owned by individuals, and that any violation of that property is a serious transgression. Nevertheless, it is not inaccurate to point out that ownership is, at its core, a social construct. There is no tangible attachment to any physical body but the imaginary one we agree upon as a collective species to sustain our society. This is proven by the fact that things one owns remain unchanged when one dies (eg. a man’s house will not face any physical transformation when the man dies, at least not one that arises from his death). 

Continuing with this line of thought, one could argue that the only physical substance that irreparably changes after an individual’s death is the same individual’s body. Thus, one can claim that true ownership is only present when referring to a person and their physical bodies, as there is an indivisible inextricable link between a human’s physical body and their life as we understand it. Life cannot survive the death of the physical body, nor can the physical body survive the end of life, which establishes a strong bond between life and body to the point where they can be understood as the same thing. 

The way each of their existences seems to depend on the continuation of the other shapes our understanding of them as somewhat inseparable. It is perhaps the only tangible ownership connection that can be discerned. It may be concluded that true ownership only materializes itself when it comes to a human’s body and life. 

CHAPTER II. Fear of death 

This chapter will attempt to find an explanation as to why suicide cannot be logically attributed to biological or social determinism. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the topic at hand, it should be noted that the author does not intend to develop a psychological, sociological, or biological account of suicide, but to look at the core claims that place suicide as a consequence of biological and/or social determinism and untangle them to decipher if they are rightfully stated or not. 

a) Suicide and biological determinism 

Biological determinism holds that actions are determined by an individual’s physiology. Thus, biological determinists would be inclined to state that suicide is nothing but the aftermath of a chemical event. This is the case when one examines suicide as the result of a mental health condition, such as depression. Notwithstanding, it can be argued that the condition only fuels self-destructive tendencies, but the presence of those tendencies can be overridden by the exercise of free will, and the decision to act upon them or not ultimately is an individual’s to take. 

Either side of the argument is difficult to disprove through the use of logical reasoning alone, although both appear to be equally feasible. 

Withal, if one was to agree with the biological determinist stance, it would open a new debate about the primary drive of any living organism: the self-preservation instinct. If this tendency (often referred to as survival instinct) takes precedence over any other physiological event, then wouldn’t it outweigh suicidal propensities? If anything, the decision to take one’s life challenges and ultimately wins over a human’s self-preservation instinct. Therefore, arguing that suicide can be explained by appealing to biological determinism becomes self-refuting in many ways. Though it does not fully disprove it, it poses a viable alternative to interpreting voluntary death. 

b) Suicide and social determinism 

Social determinism opens a discussion about social structures conditioning certain individuals to take their own lives. Although the way society works indisputably causes large amounts of suffering, one cannot deny how arbitrary and essentially unpredictable the circumstances that lead up to a person’s suicide are. As noted by Améry, “it is undeniable that there are acts of suicide that, at first glance, have hardly anything to do with each other as far as their casualty, their transsuicidal intentions, and even their ranking are concerned”. It seems as though individuals of all races, socioeconomic statuses, nationalities, backgrounds, and genders can engage in such an act, which suggests that it cannot be reduced to a set of emotions caused by social circumstances—which therapeutic views of suicide often propose. 

As pointed out by the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, libertarian Thomas Szasz is “strongly associated with the ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement of the last half century. According to that movement, attempts by the state or by the medical profession to interfere with suicidal behaviour are essentially coercive attempts to pathologize morally permissible exercises of individual freedom”. Similarly, Jean Améry stated that “the inclination to voluntary death is not a sickness of which one has to be cured as one is cured of measles”. Szasz and Améry’s view on a medical explanation for suicidal behaviour is that it is reductionist and ultimately inaccurate, Szasz going as far as to call it a restrain on individual freedom. 

According to Améry, people kill themselves because living in a wretched condition prevents the individual from having any dignity. Suicide then turns into the logical conclusion to an inner debate regarding whether life is worth living or not. Regarding social determinism as a probable cause for suicide, Améry writes: “Is and always has been an extraordinary act that goes beyond the customary ordering of individual and social existence; this it has been even in circumstances where it has been socially accepted as a duty of honor (hari-kari) or as an obligation of taste (Petronius) or even as an order in the name of an unwritten officer’s quote (Lieutenant Gustl)”.  

Thomas Szasz took a similar stand regarding this issue. He believed that the State took a hypocritical stand when it penalized suicide allegedly based on the premise that it could be prevented through psychological aid, considering that its regard for life appeared to be fluid to aid their stand at its convenience. It follows to recognize that, while social determinism may aid in explaining suicide under certain circumstances, it is too broad of a claim to ascertain that it does so in every instance related to voluntary death. One might go on to state that it is ultimately a subjective question about whether life is worth living or not. 

CHAPTER III. A life worth living 

After demonstrating that an action like suicide cannot be fully explained by social or biological determinism, this chapter will set out to explore the thought process that leads an individual to take their own life in order to conclude if suicide can be the logical conclusion of a rational thought process and not an undefeatable compulsion. Section a) will focus on the arguments posed by Jean Améry in “On Suicide”, where he thoroughly discusses why the reasons that lead someone to choose voluntary death can be deemed logical even if they cannot be expressed. Section b) will examine suicide as a response to realizing what Camus referred to as the absurdity of life in “The Myth of Sisyphus”.  

a) On choosing voluntary death. 

Based on his personal experience, Améry indicates that the reasons behind suicide are valid irrespective of the individual’s ability to verbalize them. Barlow sums this up by declaring that “for Améry, […] the alienations and setbacks one experiences in one’s life could lead to legitimate reasons for choosing a voluntary death, regardless of whether those reasons can be communicated”. He further elaborates on this idea: “One is trying to understand reasons expressed in a language that is individually subjective and not persuasive in the language of everyday life”. Améry discusses the idea that suicide means to engage in contradiction and truly embrace the unknown (i.e. non-existence) and calls the individual that does it “a person of nonsense” which, to him, is inherently different from “deluded sense”. 

Amplifying this syntactic distinction, Améry claims that “anyone who wants to commit suicide is breaking out, out of the logic of life”. He explains that desire to continue living often stems from habit and not from actively choosing to do so, asking the reader: “Do you have to live? […] In the moment before the leap, suicides tear to pieces a prescription of nature and throw it at the feet of the invisible prescriber”. The rejection and eventual intentional termination of conscious experience through the exercise of that same consciousness presents a logical contradiction that, in its feasibility, denotes the presence of freedom. 

The issue of coexistent logic and illogicality of voluntary death is quite revealing when determining the role that free will plays in choosing it. Améry writes: “Actually, someone standing before the leap […] has at the same time one foot still in the logic of life and the other in the anti-logical logic of death. Because we mean by the logic of life not only the immanent logic of behaviour that preserves the self and the species, to which we are tributary, but also the logic gained from this logic as an abstraction of higher order, one that weighs being against being, sets one against the other, […] because there is no bridge from being to nonbeing, because of all this, we are helpless in thinking about death”. Human’s perception of death is intrinsically contradictory, as it involves the conceptualization of something which lies outside one’s empirical knowledge. In turn, this transforms the awareness of mortality into a tortuous exercise which came to be from having the cognitive capacity to be aware of death but lacking the means to know what comes after. 

For Améry, humans can only reconcile these two opposing notions by choosing voluntary death. He claims that it is not even necessary to engage in the act itself, but simply by making the decision one truly embraces and rationalizes the “nonsense”. The active pursuit for what cannot be understood—death and the unknown—contradicts human nature and, as such, can only be attained through the unconstrained exercise of free will. 

b) Linking suicide, freedom, and the absurd 

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy states that “Camus sees this question of suicide as a natural response to an underlying premise, namely that life is absurd in a variety of ways”. Absurd, in this case, describes the realization that life has no meaning whatsoever, and suicide—Camus argues—seems to be an appropriate response to that realization, as seen in the following extract: “In a sense, and as in melodrama, killing yourself amounts to confessing. It is confessing that life is too much for you or that you do not understand it”. 

He further develops the notion of the absurd by asserting that “you continue making the gestures commanded by existence, for many reasons, the first of which is habit. Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of any profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of suffering”. Here, he summarizes the idea that living is nothing but the natural state in which we find ourselves and that, the more one contemplates it, the more one is enlightened to the many things that make it unbearable. 

Agreeing with Camus’s premise on the inescapable absurdity of life means agreeing that suicide can be the conclusion of a rational inner debate on whether life is worth living or not. He wrote: “At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world. […] This must be clung to because the whole consequence of a life can depend on it.”. The lack of fulfilment that comes from being denied an answer to the question of the meaning of life can amount to the reasoning that suicide is the only path that remains.  

It is worth noting that Camus ends his essay by claiming that life’s meaninglessness does not have to end in suicide. Referencing the character that inspires the title of his essay which he used as a microcosm for humanity, he states that “one must imagine Sisyphus happy”, in spite of the absurdity that permeates his existence because as individuals, our lives have no meaning but the one that is consciously given to it through action and perception. Nonetheless, doing so requires a decision that one can just as easily decide not to carry out. Camus acknowledges that, ultimately, the continuation of life in spite of being aware of its nature depends solely on the individual that owns it and the way they choose to exercise their free will. 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, a thorough analysis of free will and suicide has been carried out to answer the question “In what ways can suicide be interpreted as proof for the existence of free will?”. All things considered, it cannot be stated that suicide is the proportional effect of any given cause, given its intrinsic nature and the fact that it originates from an effect sourced within a human’s space of consciousness. Likewise, appealing to biological and/or social determinism only explains voluntary death to a certain extent, and ultimately does not address the issue in its entirety. Moreover, asking oneself whether life is worth living, concluding that it is not, and deciding to end one’s life has been proven to be a logical response to a rational thought process, even though the debate is inherently illogical. Suicide as a potential and factual phenomenon can only be feasible if individuals have free will. 

From these observations, one may conclude that voluntary death can and should be interpreted as proof for the existence of free will. This Extended Essay defied the foundations upon which many determinist theories have been built and conducted a thorough autopsy of the relationship between suicide and free will. When approached through the lens of libertarianism, it becomes clear that acknowledging and scrutinizing suicide takes the free will discussion to a whole new different level. 

As was pointed out in the Introduction, the perpetual possibility of voluntary death defies our perception of humans are exclusively determined creatures. Jean Améry declares that “as a way of death, however, voluntary death is still freely chosen even when one is trapped in a vise of compulsions; there is no carcinoma that devours me, no infarction that fells me, no uremic crisis that takes away my breath. I am that which lays hands upon me, who dies after taking barbiturates “from hand to mouth”.”. It is fundamentally in the individual’s power to forfeit the right to exist and exercise the right to terminate their life. 

Notes

Améry, Jean. “On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death.” Translated by John D. Barlow. Indiana University Press, 1999. 

Aronson, Ronald. “Albert Camus.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), accessed February 15, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/camus/. 

Camus, Albert. “The Myth of Sisyphus: and Other Essays.” Translated by Justin O’Brien. Vintage Books, 1959. 

Cholbi, Michael. “Suicide.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), accessed February 15, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/suicide/. 

Cioran, Emil. “Drawn and Quartered.” Translated by Richard Howard. Arcade Publishing, 2012. 

Cioran, Emil. “On the Heights of Despair.” Translated by Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston. The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 

Cioran, Emil. “The Trouble with Being Born.” Translated by Richard Howard. Arcade Publishing, 2012. 

Davidson, Donald. “Essays on Actions and Events.” Oxford University Press, 1980. 

de Melo-Martin, Inmaculada. “When is Biology Destiny? Biological Determinism and Social Responsibility.” PhilSci Archive, 2002, accessed February 15, 2021. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1062. 

“Meaning of suicide in English.” Cambridge Dictionary, accessed February 15, 2021. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/suicide. 

Nagel, Thomas. “The Absurd.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 20, 1971, p. 716. DOI:10.2307/2024942. 

Nezet, N. L., Williams, G., White, C., and Lee, D. “Philosophy: Being Human. Course Companion (IB Diploma Programme).” Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 

O’Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin. “Free Will.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), accessed February 15, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/freewill/. 

Schlosser, Markus. “Agency.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019, accessed February 15, 2021. plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/. 

SparkNotes Editors. “The Myth of Sisyphus Study Guide.” SparkNotes, 2007, accessed February 15, 2021. www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/sisyphus/. 

Szasz, Thomas. “The Ethics of Suicide.” JSTOR, Antioch Review Inc., 1971. www.jstor.org/stable/4637376. 

Springsteen, Bruce. “For You.” Greetings from Asbury Park, N.J., Mike Appel, and Jim Cretecos. Columbia, June 22, 1972. 

Wilson, George, Samuel Shpall, and Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock. “Action.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), accessed February 15, 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/action/. 

The presence of mono no aware in Japanese poetics

by Hayden Foldhazy, Philosopher

There is a definitive relationship between the content of Japanese arts and the aesthetic principle of mono no aware (sensitivity to ephemera, 物の哀れ), which came to be formally recognized amongst the people – as an actual facet of said arts – shortly after literati Motoori Norinaga’s analysis of Genji no Monogatari was published. It is only in his shorter essay however, titled On Mono no Aware, that Norinaga provides a clearer image of what exactly a feeling of mono no aware entails, its origins, and how it is used in the creation of song (uta, 歌 or 詩). Here we will begin with the linguistic origins of the term as it will be easier to map the ways in which it has transformed in use and meaning, moreover to better understand its context and content in modern songs. 

Thus, we turn our attention first to aware’s translation in earlier literature as an expression of sighing; like the English ah! or oh! Interestingly though, Norinaga makes no claims on whether this expression was ever used outside literature – in spoken language – as we often do in Western tongues to convey our displeasure or comfort directly. The sigh of relief is the best example I can think of, when one sits down after a long day and utters that customary breath of solace. Or perhaps for a more aesthetically derived sensation, when one gasps at a view of nature or painting in awe. He merely refers to it as a word that would express this action of sighing in song, which suggests otherwise; and I only bring this up because I am not – from my own experiences – familiar with anyone who uses the term aware colloquially [B 174]. Rather, Japanese speakers usually reply with a simple aa (ああ) or softer haa (はあ) when met with external pains or pleasure, which brings us to our next point. Though aware is, to this day, most often written as 哀れ, using the kanji for sorrow (哀), Norinaga emphasizes that aware is not a feeling of mere sadness; nor is it on the other hand one of mere happiness when written as 柯怜, using the kanji for compassion. Aware is an all encompassing term that articulates a broad range of feelings, but does so at a deep and most sympathetic level from within oneself. And so, when he explains what it means to know mono no aware it becomes clear why we are so concerned with songs and especially why there is no mono no aware without consideration for emotions of the heart (kokoro, 心). 

To know mono no aware is, on its surface level, a recognition of this action of sighing; what Norinaga describes as our fundamental “understanding of the nature of these things, and know[ing] how to be moved by them,” [B 173]. These things he mentions are where the mono (thing, 物) in the phrase mono no aware come from; where mono explicitly refers to objects of the external world – tangible things and never their ideas. So, if we take the two parts of the phrase in unison we literally have something that means the ah! (aware) of (no) things (mono). We see here as well why the phrase is so often translated into English as a sensitivity to ephemera, because the objects which bring about this ah! are only temporary. They are fleeting moments, rising and falling from the things our thoughts and emotions are derived – but we will return to this briefly when discussing particular songs. The feeling exhibited by mono no aware is hence best summarized as one where we experience and identify a deep awe in a particular something – ie., anything, whether it be the moon or a facile teacup. Norinaga makes it clear that all mono are capable of this and act on us involuntarily. But what is it that he really means when he says to know how to be moved by them? It would seem simply acknowledging our sighing is not enough then, and that something else is inexplicably involved. We have haphazardly thrown the term understanding about till now, implying at the very least that there is a process of learning attached to this aesthetic, and so I will attempt from here to interpret what this understanding consists of. 

Norinaga’s explanation is – ironically – a bit shallow. However what he alludes to in his introduction, when explaining the difference between man and animal, is that consciousness of one’s feelings is necessary for the aesthetic experience to occur; not just the action itself. Circling back to the heart (kokoro, 心) I mentioned previously, Norinaga claims that all living creatures possess one unquestionably – going so far as to state that they too are capable of song – but only man is in possession of a deeply moving heart, due to their superior ability to perform actions and also reflect on them. Moreover, he explains this quality of depth in terms of our greater exposure to actions which I interpret as our conducts, or functions, which assail the basic animalistic ones of survival. Consequently, only man can realize, ie., actualize, this aesthetic in a manner of self expression [B 172]. We are after all beings that think about thinking itself, making us more intimately aware of our situation. And so, when met with the external things we can act upon, the reflection of our actions – ie., the thinking thinking – causes our hearts to move with sentiment far more than any other creature, to the point we can not withhold the feeling within ourselves any longer. Ergo we sigh. The understanding, or the how, is therefore this very consciousness of the emotional response exhibited toward the object in question. We do not just sigh and move on from our sentiment, but relish in it until the sentiment itself moves from us; we watch the object – the thing – perish before us and in this find what beauty is. Thus to fully know mono no aware, in chorus one must be aware of the movement their feelings undergo, the thing that is causing this movement, and why the thing is causing this to occur. Perhaps from here it would be best to analyze how mono no aware comes about in song: what Norinaga asserts to be the realized, human expression of this sentiment.

From his own Suzunoya Shū, we consider the song Insects in front of the moon:

Mushi no ne ka (Is it the sound of the insects?)

Izure ni otsuru (Where are these tears)

Aware to mo (From a deep sentiment falling — ) 

Namida wakarenu (That never leave)

Aki no yo no tsuki (The moon on an autumn night?) [B 96]

The second and third lines are explicative of the songwriter’s emotions, the first condition we proposed of knowing mono no aware; awareness of one’s sentiment as related to the object at hand. There is a melancholic feeling expressed by the mention of tears that progresses into a chasmic, inexhaustibleness of their presence in the fourth line: tears that never leave. These words in particular suggest mono no aware to be a perpetual condition of man – thanks to their deeply moving heart – to always be in or affected by emotion; in this case one of woe. The first and fifth lines are offered as questions to satisfy the second and third conditions; to identify and inquire of the things causing our feeling, or our heart to move. Here these things are the sound of the insects and the moon respectively. We see once again that the mono under discussion are experienceable, tangible things that can always be reconciled with an action. As such, aware is often used in direct conjunction with verbs to relay this explicitly – something lacking in this song. Nevertheless, it is still implied in this instance by the sound of the insects, requiring us to listen, and the presence of the autumn moon, requiring us to see. We can surmise this better from the following phrases Norinaga provides in his analytical essay: tsuki wo aware to iu (sighing over the moon) and hito wo aware to iu (to be moved by someone[‘s words]), where aware to iu is a sighing (aware) accompanied by speaking (iu). Returning to the mono of this song, Insects in front of the moon, we emphasize again that the things responsible for our emotion are only temporary, like the seasons. The insects do not sing forever, being a conventional symbol of the summer, and the autumn moon will only appear in its respective months; yet an appreciation for them and all their beauty spawns from this finitude.

In modern poetry especially, mono no aware presents itself this way thematically; in metaphors for transience, almost always in relation to the passing of the seasons and their things. Consider the first two stanzas from Nakahara Chūya’s Summer Night:

Ah, in my tired heart

a cherry-pink woman     passes by,

a woman passes by.

In the summer night the paddy field’s sledge,

resentment has faded away.

— Will the surrounding mountains’ seasons come round? [A 55]

The song begins with an ah but it is not for me to say if this ah would be translated directly as something like aware to mo. We can still infer however that there is a sighing action taking place here, signified by a tired heart. It is accompanied by this symbolic passing of spring through the cherry-pink woman; representative of the cherry blossoms which come and pass in the April to May months marking summer’s approach – hence the next stanza beginning with a summer’s night. Cherry blossoms are synonymous with beauty in Japan because of their short-viewed presence and cyclical nature – of birth and death, not unlike our own movement through life. Transience is reflected in almost every line of this song, but the emotion developed from this temporariness of things is best found in the fifth and final stanza:

In my tired heart,     a petal passes by;

from time to time a gong grazes the writings.

The mist is lovely, but hot! [A 55]

The last line specifically emphasizes this bittersweetness partnered with the very passage of time. Moreover, in the prior line – similar to Norinaga – we also see this allusion to mono no aware’s incessant presence in man; as a gong which sounds from time to time, sparking what seems to be Chūya’s writings themselves: uta. Norinaga’s claim that song is the actualized knowing of mono no aware shines through here; as we are met with an overwhelming nostalgia – a lovely but hot mist – in response to the subtleties of living – time’s movement across things – that we must outwardly articulate.

It is not completely dissimilar in form from Western poetry, where poets seek to articulate emotion in writing. Except, the latter’s tendency to project feelings into objects – and not vice versa, where objects project feelings onto us involuntarily – drastically changes the content away from mono no aware. In the case of Chūya, we see that an experience of witnessing the passage of time has caused the melancholic response to this summer night. But in Western poetry we often see an already present feeling be signaled metaphorically by something that could occur, usually through imagery. Take for instance William Blake’s Ah! Sun-flower:

Ah Sun-flower! weary of time,

Who countest the steps of the Sun:

Seeking after that sweet golden clime

Where the travellers journey is done.

Where the Youth pined away with desire,

And the pale Virgin shrouded in snow:

Arises from their graves and aspire,

Where my Sun-flower wishes to go.

I chose this poem in particular, not only because it uses this ah! similar to our other songs, but because it uses nature – important in Japanese songs of aware – as an allusion for man. It is not even subtle, as the sun-flower is itself personified, being able to count the Sun’s steps – the days passing by – and wishing to go where the Youth and pale Virgin find themselves – presumably Heaven, after death. Here, feelings are contrarily idealized into the things rather than subjectively impressed by judgements offered of the things as in the case of Chūya or Norinaga. This is not to say Blake was not inspired by the viewing of a sun-flower to write this poem, but because the sun-flower is meant – in the context of the last line – to articulate its own feelings we are dealing with a more objective, outwardly-positioned scrutinization of life and beauty; ie., a judgment from outside the thing as it is. Beauty and hope for a peaceful death are positioned into the sun-flower rather than being found within it. There are of course many similarities to be encountered here too; mostly in regards to the poem’s apprehension of time and our own finitude. The weary sun-flower that tracks every day as it passes, accepting its eventual demise exhibits something close to the person who experiences aware’s appreciation for fleetingness; but again, the position – the sentiment – is one that is offered by us through an image of an object: the sun-flower.  

In short summary then, mono no aware is not unlike a direct expression of yūgen, which seeks to turn this action of sighing at the underlying sentiment of things into singing (utatte, 歌って) about beauty as it is. And though these feelings spring onto us involuntarily from the objects themselves, we are able to comprehend them subjectively via their accompaniment to our specific actions; such as watching the rain (ame wo aware to mite iru, 雨を哀れと見ている). Thus, it would seem the most important qualities of mono no aware are its derivation from the surrounding world as well as its recognition of beauty in finitude; very different from the traditional Western aesthetic which emphasizes beauty as ideal, permanent structures. In modern Japanese songs we have also seen how this aesthetic has continued, almost always in the songs’ contents, whereas traditional lyrics – from the likes of Norinaga – articulated this aware in the very form of the language. Today, in a contemporary Japan that moves further and further from the traditional values of its ancestors each generation, we still see this sentiment for the impermeant – perhaps, ironically, this is why the landscape is so open to change and progresses with ease into a modern world, as nostalgia is felt, allowed to pass, and not contrived. The people still practice hanami (flower-viewing parties of the cherry blossoms, 花見) and yet welcome new developments to the tradition as needed. Mono no aware has consequently become more than a literary phrase in poetics; it has become an aesthetic of living.  

Notes

AChūya, Nakahara. The Poems of Nakahara Chūya. Translated by Maki Sugiyama and Paul Mackintosh, Gracewing Publishing, 2017.

BMotoori, Norinaga. The Poetics of Motoori Norinaga: A Hermeneutical Journey. Translated by Michael F. Marra, University of Hawaii Press, 2007.

CBlake, William. Ah! Sun-flower. 1794.

Silencing the sirens and sprites; a critique of the male’s de-feminized (and idealized) approach to women’s life, language, and philosophy

by Hayden Foldhazy, Philosopher

The world is a self-evident place: a reflexive and historical one not so easily understood. Modern times are enveloped simultaneously by modern and archaic thought, in so much as the changes which pervade our philosophy and language, both our practical and ideal ways of life, continue to be directly influenced by the markers of our past; no less than our foresight – rarely of a pure reformative nature – deems these markers necessary or contingent, whilst also positing new ones for the roads we pave ahead. 

The woman, incontestably propounded the Other by such thinkers as Simone De Beauvoir and writer Ingeborg Bachmann, is no exception to this process of idealization; as imposed by the unfortunateness of a male dominated society, ie., a male dominated history. Treated as a marker by her male counterparts, even in today’s more politically augmented social realm, the woman and her ideal is often left to the realm of the past; as if – and I hate myself for using this analogy – she is some attic-dwelling knickknack, that shan’t change but only further herself into yesterday. By this account, ie., a historical one, the woman has been relegated to a position absent of her own willing-choice: to be an autonomous voice, thinker, and overall being. This is because the man, by and large, has stood tall above this history of the world and has made the past his own; domesticating the woman to certain roles and places. Women were forced – at most points in time and still to great extent today – to become wives, childbearers, and mistresses in the name of a greater male outcome with no consideration for her own call to life. Disgusting does not begin to describe it, but perhaps – as I wish to explore here – Bachman’s declaration can: You humans! You monsters! (a, pp. 178). In the most literal and material senses, through her Undine gehta, we shall see how the man has reshaped and refined history to his liking; in a manner that has not left the woman untouched but has rather subsumed her under this Other, or immanent, thing: as projected. And further, via comparisons to De Beauvoir’s own life and thought, we shall bring to light the modern ways men continue to subdue the woman’s autonomous voice; in both philosophy and the aforementioned literature.  

Beginning with this term immanent – if I am to paraphrase De Beauvoir’s The Second Sexb – we unanimously refer to the ideal of woman as inwardly driven and directed toward the physical realm; embodying a stagnant nature, in which habit exceeds ascendance. Of course, granted the position of the man as the counterforce that has made women wives and mistresses, we can fairly reason that this immanence is not of her explicit fault. She has been subdued, ultimately, to these images (or ideals); that we shall explore further, later on through mythological and literary de-feminization by male writers and thinkers. An important thing to note here, however, is that – according to De Beauvoir – the woman is in no way inherently lacking her analogue’s transcendent nature; ie., the man’s attitude of outward extension into the world, directed toward the divine and intelligible realms (b, pp. 441 – 443). It is merely that, through her historical relegation to positions such as wife or mother, she is often rendered incapable of achieving this sort-of male status of enlightenment. She must remain in marriage or in the household. The full extent of the world, where the male’s sun (and sons) shine over the horizon of opportunity and autonomous creation, remains a closed entity to her. But how exactly has this happened? And how might we mend this superficial gap created by the sexes between the sexes? First, and most advantageously, we should proceed through the experiences of women, written and explicated by women. Thus, we return to Bachmann. 

We see this paradox, between the man (as self) and woman (as Other) – but also, by extension, the self against self within both species – expressed best through Bachmann’s mythological allusion to the undine, in her Undine geht. Traditionally, deriving from German mythology, the undine is an elemental water sprite; liminal by design, and thus capable of transcending the border between the human and spiritual realms. Thus, similar to De Beauvoir’s argument for the woman, it does not lack one nature or the other, as either masculine or feminine; it posits both, yet is limited to the immanent position by its counterpart. Bachmann, through her Undine geht, narrates a very personal story of conflict and love between the Undine – whose voice she embodies – and men in general named Hans, through this disposition to the water; ie., the realm of immanence. Though water alludes of course to some level of fluidity, which may be interpreted as transcendence, the narrative relegates the water as less involved, or intelligible, than the land belonging to the Hans (that we shall explore indepthly just a bit later). The elemental Undine opines, “I love the water, its dense transparency, the green in the water and the dumb creatures (I too shall soon be equally dumb), my hair among them, in it, the just water, the indifferent mirror that forbids me to see you differently. The wet frontier between me and me…” (a, pp. 178). There are two important notes to take from here in further analyzing the Undine as more immanent to the Hans of society. Firstly, in claiming a love for the water, the Undine makes clear her position of inwardness via a nostalgic attachment to her own realm. She, in adopting this projection of man, is rendered incapable of escape. A water elemental, nonetheless liminal, should fundamentally belong to and arise from the world of water. She describes herself as in it, amongst the dumb creatures; which is our second important acknowledgement. This is a direct assertion of the water as somewhere less intelligible to the land, ie., as something more physical and indifferent (or mediocre) where women must reside. Rather, as transcendent men, the Hans of the society are not forced to belong amongst these dumb creatures nor do they wish to venture, “into that element in which no one builds a nest, raises a roof over rafters, covers himself with an awning. To be nowhere, to stay nowhere,” (a, pp. 178). The Hans, by this account, are free beings ironically more fluid than the Undine. They are dynamic and self assertive which enables them to build a society from the ground, ie., the land, upwards. The Undine, however, must remain a vassal to be sought by the man in his loneliness. And once he is done with her, to the water she must always return; that groundless realm where nothing she is producing or produces can stand.

To compare this with modern issues of society, a common difference – expounded by feminist movements – seen between men and women today is their willingness to change for one-another. Most often referred to as the double standard, women are – to a profoundly higher degree – expected to change their inherent personalities to conform to the male dominated society: the one of transcendence. By these means they become, and are forced to become, more masculine. Immanence is – seemingly – to be forgotten. Bachmann makes allusion to this phenomena via the notion of the Undine’s elemental nature, as water, and that of the clearing. The clearing, wherein the Undine always meets a man named Hans, accordingly represents the male dominated society that seeks to reshape her by striking the water from her arms, and licking the dew from her hair (a, pp. 177). To remove the water from the water sprite means to change the very being -itself; and in return the male offers no recompense, ie., no amendment of his own position. He does not join the water sprite in her realm – to become more feminine – or seek to grant her access to his own. He expects the world to surrender itself to him for nothing, and the modern world has consequently begun to (rightfully so) clamor him for it. We see this abundantly today in the working realm, to which men and women are purportedly now equally admitted. But it is simple to see the irony here, should we open our eyes to the material world, as men so often do not, looking upon their red flags with red-tinted frames. Orientation in thinking is important to make note of here as well; granted the man is raised to think transcendence is the solution for autonomy; as if god is becoming of him. Nevertheless, aside from the easily recognizable pay gaps between them, there are also the issues of representation and accommodation for women workers; who, of course, have social and biological limitations that do not necessarily overlap the male’s. These are – but are not limited to – menstruation, childbirth, constant fear of sexual assault and harassment, and being a minority in male dominated professions. I do not mean to present these as disadvantages, but merely explicate their social constructivism and the differences they create between the sexes regarding the aforementioned: representation and accommodation. Eg., the woman who bears a child and must take leave from work is rarely accommodated for such absence, with pay that is; as if she should be punished for something, frankly, out of her control (See c and e). Though it is her choice – at least in instantiated circumstances – to have a child, it is not her explicit desire to put her own life on hold and abandon the working environment. This she lacks control over; the hardships of childbirth and child raising are far too physically and mentally exhaustive to allow for both activities to persist. Further, eg., the woman who constantly fears harassment is seen as hysterical or irrational; as if – from the male’s vile perspective – she was not asking for it: “…crying it out, Hans, Hans…,” (a, pp. 177). Nevertheless, her fostering of yet another male ideal, ie., of something like motherhood or mistress, leads once again to her punishment by the male. It is a rather ass backwards concept to wrap one’s head around; one that the Undine seeks to understand here: “You monsters, that was why I loved you, because you knew what the call meant, because you allowed yourselves to be called, because you were never in agreement with yourselves,” (a pp. 181). The Hans understand what it is that they do, in purporting their own transcendence as the path of least resistance – toward a self willing life – whilst simultaneously leaving the Undine in her dark obscuring tides. Life is played like a game by them.

Additionally from Undine geht, continuing via the juxtaposition made of the Undine, the Hans, and their wives; Bachmann comments on the double standard confounded by the very institution of marriage, through an interesting notion of language. It is presented as a force of ensnarement, securing the woman within these social positions via relegation to ideal figures, known only by self-conception of word:

You who make women your mistresses and wives, one-day wives, week-end wives, lifetime wives and let yourselves be made into their husbands. (Perhaps that is worth waking up for.) You with your jealousy of your women, with your arrogant forbearance and tyranny, your search for sanctuary with your women; you with your housekeeping money and your joint good-night conversations, those sources of new strength, of the conviction that you are right in your conflicts with the outside world, you with your helplessly skillful, helplessly absent-minded embraces. I was amazed to see that you give your wives money for the shopping and for clothes and for the summer holiday, then you invite them out (invite them, that means you pay, of course). You buy and let yourselves be bought (a, pp. 180).

We see here that the Hans are essentially capable of relegating all of the women in their lives to these various positions of companionship – as wives, one-day wives, etc. – without any consequences becoming their sole position as husband. And further, as the Undine, Bachmann describes the male tendency toward jealousy and their overall self-contradictory natures – to buy and let themselves be bought – belonging once again to this modern notion of the double standard. After all, men are excessively and scarily more likely to confront and assault women on the bases they are unfaithful, or simply not fulfilling their duties as a lover or wife. But the man, irregardless, does not need to prove this same sentiment to the woman. The word wife carries much more weight than that of the husband, as she is expected to subsume herself under the husband and the sanctity of the marriage; whereas, in Bachmann, we see the man flee his home the first chance he can scrounge, to entertain himself with whom he call mistresses such as the Undine, who herself seeks true companionship and becomes angry with man’s continued unfaithfulness. De Beauvoir similarly comments on the power marriage (as an ideal) extends to the male, by means of his literal, material taking a wife. The act of communion – once the woman has said the words I do, and transformed into a bride – allows him to dip  his toes into the realm of immanence, but only to anchor himself to the social construct that marriage – as an archaic practice, and au fond realization of religious dowry – has enabled him as superiority; at best to raise a family, and yet nonetheless such that he may still escape the household in the dark of night, just like the Hans to seek his fun elsewhere (b, pp. 442 – 445). Language-itself is an extremely important notion to continue with from here, as being the idealization of power that allows men to subdue the societal position of women, to the mere immanent realm; what I ultimately hope to demonstrate here, through Bachmann and De Beauvoir, as the underlying cause for obstruction of the Other’s own lack of self-realization.

When the woman says I do, the man takes his wife. Preliminarily however the woman must be called a woman, such that the man can relegate her nextly to the position of wife. The language at play here is already, historically speaking, one of subservience. But let us return to Bachmann once again, and consider the very notion (or word) – in the most abstract terms – of the undine, so that we might better understand this. The process of de-feminization, after all, has taken its most grandiose form from literature that spreads false ideas on material concepts and beings. Many classical myths written by men, because only they were entrusted to read and write – and to embody those intelligible qualities – depict women as such as muses and sirens; another characteristic of the traditional undine, alluded to by Bachmann through the call. Undine we’re often shown residing in ponds and near waterfalls, singing their alluring songs to attract male suitors; and Bachmann’s own Undine takes up this role by asking the man to, “Come. Just once. Come,” (a, pp. 186). An important question is raised by this idealization of the undine, granted the material woman has been reformulated by the male author into some divine and to be feared creature of myth (ie., idea). What if, absent of any writing man’s intention, the undine as a being itself simply desired to sing for singing’s sake? To be independent? Ie., as figures created by men, mythological beings like the undine possess no means of autonomous creation or real being for themselves. From De Beauvoir, we see that the woman’s being is formulated as, “subordinate, secondary, parasitic…the very meaning of her life is not in her hands,” and this begins at their conception; their relegation, by male language and attitude, to the immanent place of the ideal woman. Their singing voices, their beauty and all else, were crafted by men for men. Thus, in this sense, Bachmann’s Undine geht provides a fervent commentary on the very male-designed nature of the woman-itself, as pure ideal, and literature as a tool for this continued means of subjugation to certain words or nouns; just as De Beauvoir proves through historical, philosophical notions. Overall, they both suggest this relegation to nouns, such as wife, leave the woman in a position absent of autonomy or joy. Consider more ardently De Beauvoir’s description of the work conscripted by idealized marriage: “The woman’s work within the home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly useful to society, it does not open out on the future, it produces nothing,” (b, pp. 442). To produce nothing means her work is considered without purpose and thus a work done beside herself; for the sheer intent of defending the male and male society. And so, it remains a struggle for women authors to find their creative voice because her purported natural position has always been one directed by the male’s compass. This is not to say women have not tried or succeeded in self production. Merely from a materialist stand, his voice has preceded hers in telling which direction to take the story, which characters to write, and how they should behave.  

This is all to summarily say books written by men  – and all other things from which language arises as word or speech or sign – will appeal more enthusiastically to men; but not as if they contain any right, as any sort-of pure knowledge of what is good or is in general. It is merely a historical appeal governed by the ruling vehemence and language. Thus, when the transcendent attitude dominates so too will literature and all other parts of society seek ascendance; and consequently abandon any other means of self-realization. Bachmann, as Undine, further states to demonstrate this phenomenon of language’s permeance and male guidance, “Never was there so much magic over things as when you spoke, and never were words so powerful. You could make speech flare up, become muddled or mighty. You did everything with words and sentences, came to an understanding with them or transmuted them, gave things a new name; and objects, which understand neither the straight nor the crooked words, almost took their being from your words,” (a, pp. 186). And so, we can see just how much power is held behind the simple terms crafted by those transcendent male literates: of woman, of wife, of undine and so on. By merely naming her Undine – along with coining terms for all other objects of the world – the Hans have conquered the world-itself. The world, inadvertently, has become a reflection of them (ie., those terms and language) because the world-itself, the land, is a fundamentally male ideal. They have sought, in giving the Undine her voice, to simultaneously strip her of it and its considered-seductive power; even though they were the ones to first posit her seductiveness and seek her company.

Contradiction, as Bachmann has already told us, is the nature of life for all, the Undine and the Hans alike. But by these same means the Hans have unequivocally captured the linguistic power of contradiction between idea and object, to place themselves above the immanent and the women within it. Whilst he can think! be! and speak out!, she does not understand and cannot understand (a, pp. 181) The dictionary written by the man, ie., the language he creates and contorts, will speak for none other than himself. He has the material power to change his willing-being. The ideal of the woman however, crafted by men for men, inherently lacks her experiential basis in this world for the men have always tried to talk themselves over her: to silence her alluring song without ever truly listening. Margaret Simons makes a good example of this regarding De Beauvoir’s own publications – especially of The Second Sex – and the historical interpretations provided by male philosophers (and translators), who have often subordinated her works under the likes of male existentialists Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Some as she further notes even claim Sartre to have written De Beauvoir’s works, excluding her name from their citations, consequently overlooking any possibility for an original thought to have arisen from a woman. The relationship between De Beauvoir and Sartre is commonly misstated and exaggerated; formulating her as a  figure of dependence (ie., immanence). And very rarely is she even mentioned by name, with some male thinkers simply referring to her as that woman and then proceeding in great detail to encounter Sartre (d, pp. 104, 106). Truly, I must give credit where credit is due: for us males, as the ‘intelligible ones’, to have gone to such remarkable lengths to prove ourselves the other way around; and take no credit for it. How humble indeed! But I digress, it is sufficiently evident from these experiences we have hence endeavored – by and through women – the extent to which the male has subsumed the use of language in all its contradictory nature – as the torture house of being – over his female half; both within and outside of himself.

And so, to conclusively reiterate this notion of idealization and de-feminization, I ask; is it not the case that the woman whose nude body we have so longingly encased in marble is placed – unquestionably – freely on the museum floor, whilst the woman who wishes merely not to wear a bra in public – to seek domain over her body –  is condemned? The separation between the ideal woman and the material being has imposed such a great harm to her existence in this world, to the point she has – as Bachmann says – taken her being directly from the crooked words of a male society’s creation. This subordination, first and foremost, begins with language and has been perpetuated throughout history by the male dominated literature (and its interpretations) of ideals. The sprite we are taught to  worship and the siren we are told to fear have unanimously represented one being: the woman. And her voice, first shattered and then silenced by her male counterparts, will slip unheard into the trench of the immanent sea should we not come, just once, and listen. Ground yourself in the material of the woman, even if you are not one; do not seek to transcend it. You are but a dumb creature too, who likes to play at god and treat the world as mere soil when the world – come the day we shall all dissolve from our ideals of men and women – uses you only as fertilizer. Because the world cares not which you are or which you choose to be; it simply asks to remain whole through us. This is self-evident. 

Notes

aBachmann, Ingeborg. Undine geht, The Thirtieth Year: Stories, Translated by Michael Bullock. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., NY, 1964. pp. 177 – 187.

bDe Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex, Translated and edited by H.M. Parshley. Lowe and Brydone (Printers) LTD., London, 1956.

cGovernment of, U.S. “The Federal Register.” Federal Register, Part 825 – The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, United States Department of Labor, 6 Feb. 2013, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-V/subchapter-C/part-825#825.217.

dSimons, Margaret A. Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., MD, 1999. pp. 101 – 114.

eWisniewski, Megan. “In Puerto Rico, No Gap in Median Earnings between Men and Women.” Census.gov, United States Census Bureau, 20 Oct. 2022, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/03/what-is-the-gender-wage-gap-in-your-state.

The self in Kantian reason; opposing the referential self in favor of the Nishidan reflexive (or religious) worldview

by Hayden Foldhazy, Philosopher

The Kantian form of reason, following the self-critical procedure of the Critique of Pure Reasona, most notably remains an issue of transcendence; one that has attracted criticism and reformulation from many who describe it as too abstract. That is, in seeking to understand or grasp some semblance of reason -itself (bloße Vernunft), Kant proposed we must search outside of the phenomenal world belonging to and arising from the senses; so as to endeavor those absolute, non experientially conditioned maxims of reason, its principles, and its products. To do so however one must work from within reason -itself: the inescapable, transcendental condition upon which all knowledge is – as a final stopping point – purportedly realized. An important outcome of this study of reason by reason was the Kantian claim that knowledge of self is an impossibility – floating in noumena – via an early, semantic notion of the I as mere contentless subject, transcendentally designated. The I, using his logic of subject, lacks any direct affirmation (or negation) of oneself; acting as a mere indexical to synthesize determinate, particular conscious acts under one universal form of awareness. But before we proceed with exploring how this transcendental condition ultimately influences a philosophy of knowledge of the self – what Kant opposes at every turn, and only defends in terms of self-consciousness – it is important we understand what procedure pure reason follows in necessarily realizing our knowledge. Thus, let us begin with illustrating (what I shall call) the Kantian procession of thoughtful attainment; starting from the very beginning: seeing, touching, hearing, etc. 

All objects first encountered in the world via the senses are considered by Kant to be appearances, separate – only by means of their connectivity to reason and the understanding, and not necessarily in quality – from the things in themselves (das Ding an sich) [a, A251]. Object-appearances are given through intuition (Anschauung) as singular representations of sensibility, which are then thought through the understanding (Verstand) via concepts. The thing in itself is often reformulated as illusory – ie., seemingly real but nonetheless impossible or contradictory – for it can only be posited by the power of reason -itself, and never truly encountered or grounded in experiential terms. Perhaps it would be better to explicate this in the following terms: what Kant calls transcendental illusions contain, aside from pure intuition, judgments that inadvertently re-orient our form of pure reasoning with fallacy. The key word here, for differentiating the reasonable and intuitable, are the grounds of judgments; for judgments that lead to illusion are – more often than not – entirely subjective [a, B350-352]. Subjective judgments are particular in nature, and thus derive from a particular subject’s state of mind rather than proving something universally instantiable: ie., objective. Consider a common example, between that of sensible reality and dreams (ie., illusion). If I dream that I am in Hokkaido but am in fact on the other side of the world, upon waking from my dream I may for a short while think myself there. However, there are several things (processes) that allow me to dispel this illusion of my own condition rather quickly. One, once I am up and out of bed, I can simply look from my window and reconsider my objective position. Two, I can deliberate via reason with another person – say, my roommate who occupies the same house – that we have not been magically transported overnight. Illusion is thus easy to avoid when one, in perfect unity, combines the sensible intuitions and practices of pure reason; although ironically it is from reason -itself these transcendental illusions arise and from their arisal are ultimately considered necessary to reason [a, B354]. We shall not endeavor into this further. It is however important to take away from this talk of illusion that there is a critical difference, relayed by Kantian reason, between what is knowable and what is not. Appearances, because they are representations of phenomenal objects – and are hence attained by sensibility – are known; whereas das Ding an sich are a product of reason’s own illusion and cannot be called knowable for they are noumenal. Returning to our above example – having reasoned through our current state of experience – allows us to claim I have dreamed; but not the happenings of this dream were real. Thus reason, as critiqued by reason -itself, becomes an activity of self-imposed limitation. 

The knowable things (ie., the subjects of knowledge) are always grounded simultaneously in experience as derived from the senses, further explicated through the understanding and its consciousness of concepts, and lastly synthesized through reason’s faculty which subsumes the whole of the understanding under maximizable principles applicable to all rational beings [a, A299]. Kant refers to this process of conscious synthesis as the unity of apperception, through which all knowledge is conditionally possible – on experiential grounds which keep us on soil as sensibly intuited, and the transcendental condition of reason to exceed the world via in-experientiable, conscious processes grounded in the concepts of understanding; and their ultimate extension into the universal [a, A300]. What is alluded to here, far before any actual claims are made in favor of it, is the categorical imperative: the ethical opus and maxim of Kant’s philosophical project into practical reason [b, 421-422]. As we have already mentioned through our conversation on illusion – and as is further explicated here – reason is very much based within its own limitations and possibilities. Kant makes a great effort to always posit this in an auspicious manner nonetheless. Granted our capacity of reason is now one of margins – one of boundaries and high walls that themselves do not reach heaven (ie., transcendence) – we would seem to be trapped in the phenomenal world. We would also seem to not be free, and more importantly – for our endeavor – it makes an explicit claim that knowledge of self (and further knowledge of knowledge -itself) is impossible. 

Thus, we seem in need of something – at the very least – redemptive to our hopes and dreams which are now nothing but transcendental illusions; to our soul which is now fantasy, and to our gods which are nothing but principles confounded by reason’s necessity of absoluteness [See a, The paralogisms of pure reason]. After all, the absolute stand point of reason in many ways restricts rather than implicitly exuding freedom to all, or delegating each of us to an equal faculty of reason – itself. However, I myself do not deny his proceeding claim; that without limitations a freedom would ironically not exist at all. Laws like gravity are, simultaneously, crushing and restrictive to the imagination; and yet fundamentally, without said laws, we would know nothing of what it is like to fly. The imagination -itself would be purposeless in a world of infiniteness; ie., one in which laws are null and we act autonomously as gods. It would be quite boring incidentally. We, I will reiterate, do not disagree here. 

What I and other philosophers disagree with on the other hand, in spite of this contention for freedom as self-binding, is the means by which limitation is imposed; through the Kantian form of reason and its – decisively – contentless existence, as something seemingly inactive. Consider this from the abstract terms imposed by the categorical imperative. Maxims which are universally instantiable fundamentally lack experiential grounds – a prominent member (claim) of almost all Western ethical theories – by means of their referential method of positing reason -itself. Ethics is always seen as something noumenal, abstract, and transcendent; with no claims to be asserted of its material and historical uprising. Once again, from the standpoint of the categorical imperative, consider the very formulating act of Kant’s ethical argument whilst bearing in mind the historical circumstance of conception: the Enlightenment. Like all the rationalists inspired by the movement, Kant voids any materialist notions from the categorical imperative by working only through abstract lines of reason – said to envelop all places and all times of rational beings; through allusion to a common principle (of reason) he never once expands upon in the Critique, the Groundworks (in which it is postulated), or anything later [b, 391]. Pure moral philosophy is his goal – void of any empiricism, that would consider the way in which people act a posteriori, so as to determine these absolute, abstract grounds of morality (from reason -itself’s own abstractness). Kant entirely opposes such a motion for emotions and grounded experiences – what he commonly denotes as private happiness – to structure morality here:

Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed [b, 442].

But the issue I raise to this is the manner by which emotions directly influence our actions, and rather make reason an active form of intuition; through feelings (kanjō, 感情) and impulses (shōdō, 衝動) themselves. Rarely are these features of mind ignored, for what better – for what good – do we act more commonly than through gut feelings? These notions – and I shan’t call them notions any longer, for we all know them by heart – are definitive of a contentful self we are all made aware of through our own experience. And so it is not enough to merely deny their causal effect on action and acting, and abstract from them an ideal of perfection not anywhere on this earth; to merely reference the divine without willing it conscientiously. And so I say, the Kantian notion of the grounds of reason – as taking the form of some universal principle, purely transcendent – can not remain so (abstract) in the case of a historically framed and contentful world; and further, what I will argue for as a reflexive self, should they continue to persist in a maximizable manner. The particulars – of experience and people – must ultimately be reconsidered. My argument, following from the likes of Kitarō Nishida, makes reason -itself a material concept; an actively moving and self-orienting force, which Kant may ultimately have agreed to – to some extent – in his later essays such as What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? where he discusses the practical uses of theoretical judgements. Still, however, I have some doubts about this. But I digress; with our basic form of Kantian reason in mind, it is now time we see how reason is applied by Kant to and through the self; as the notion of self-consciousness but not self-knowledge, via indexicals. Then we shall proceed with mine and Nishida’s favorment of a religious worldview, and expound upon this source of active intuition.

Indexicals are, semantically speaking, ways of denoting oneself, others, or objects –  such as I, he/she, you, that, etc. – in terms of reference. Consequently they change meaning at every particular instance with which context is dependent. Eg., the I used whence referring to myself is not the same as the I you would use to refer to yourself. And so for sentences such as I walked to the store or I read the newspaper, there is a contextual link between the subject I and the thing being done (the action/verb); but nothing that discloses the thing being done as denoting an implicit quality of the I. This semantic process is best described as a self-reference without any means of true identification of the particular to which it references; and thus can be called universal. Kant himself denotes this as the transcendental subject of thought, through which one is said to be conscious of oneself but not known to oneself [a, A355]. The further split made by Kant – here – is of delineating the inner sense from that of the outer. The inner, where the harbor of self-consciousness non-objectively presents itself as thinking subject, is not to be confused with the outer sense, wherein: “…bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense, and not things in themselves…we cannot intuit their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc. externally; for all this belongs before inner sense,” [a, A358].

Nishda would not disagree with Kant here; neither does the Japanese language. To know the desires or feelings of another directly is impossible but not underlyingly, mediately contentless. Rather, the action of desiring to know one’s feelings is actively intuited; not merely abstracted from their bodily presence as immediately void. Consider, eg., from the Japanese language, the two statements I want an apple (watashi ha ringo ga hoshī, 私はリンゴが欲しい) and she wants an apple (kanojo ha ringo wo hoshigatte iru, 彼女はリンゴを欲しがっている). Depending on the topic of the sentence, the adjective want (hoshī, 欲しい) changes grammatical form to add a layer of uncertainty in declaring another’s desire, but remains affirmative for the self. However, the want of the other is not in any way denied possibility and – as I have stated – becomes actively, or mediately sought by the speaker via want’s change in form; as hoshī becomes hoshigatte iru (欲しがっている): meaning more closely, from the above,  (I think) she is wanting an apple. This may seem unimportant for our discussion of the self, pure reason, and all we have just been discussing; but I assure you, this will bring to light significant claims made by Nishida against Kant that we shall now delve into!

Backtracking just a few steps, let us return to the Kantian argument that empirical principles are not to be considered for universal endeavors of moral law; for this is where Nishida begins his Nothingness and the Religious Worldview:

To Kant, religion has significance as a vehicle that supplements morality. I cannot find in Kant any autonomy given to the religious consciousness itself. Perhaps he never even considered religion as an autonomous sphere. I contend, however, that the religious form of life does not fall within the sphere of mere reason, bloße Vernunft. That is why one who discusses religion must experience, to some extent at least, religious sentiment…[c, pp. 49].

Here we can see Nishida bring to the forefront his notion of kanjō, (感情); the so called religious sentiment of everyday experience that must be intuited within the world and not in transcendental form, floating above it. He greatly opposes the idea that a mere formal theory of moral consciousness (of self) can accurately depict the ways real people make decisions; as what action consists of, (ie., producing),  and what it possibly produces, (ie., product). Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative and moral self takes advantage of this separation between the act of constructing, as a thinking subject, and what is intuitively constructed, as an objective thing. People are rather incredibly emotional beings and ones who do not conform, as he puts it, to stagnant law and such a separation of material. Much like Kant himself argues regarding private happiness; the beauty is left in the eye of the beholder. What he suggests however, to amend such differences amongst people, are common transcendental predicates – derived from pure reason’s illusory faculties – to heteronomously guide the actions of all, and simultaneously provide a sense of autonomy. As we have already expounded, autonomy will by some means always require limitations; thus what concerns Nishida and I are not the limitations but their enforcement. How will we come to realize this common principle of reason if only through pure rationality? There must be material considerations to mend the paradoxical relationship imposed by the starry heavens and the moral law within. Abstracting from the material basis – the time and place of thought – will only lead to further idealization and confusion amongst individuals who will then have no idea what the universal right is. Is it not the case after all that beauty standards and all those things we call transcendent themselves change with passing time? Reason, just like the indexical I, should change with the times and context; something entirely ignored within the Critique and in The Groundworks. A common example of moral dilemma I often return to, as to expunge such universal mockery of emotional weight as is necessary to reason, is something like the trolley problem. Given a junction of train tracks whereon differing sides lie ten people and one person; the universal claim to life demands that more people should survive but without any real explanation: any material one. Pure rationality cannot solve this problem, just as pure moral theory attempts through it. As soon as you ask the person, well, why should the ten people survive?, they cannot provide any answer aside from a sentimentally justified one. Well, ten peoples’ deaths would weigh more on my conscience. Thus, they position themselves from a vector of goodness derived on impulse. The relationary status between you and the people is what fundamentally matters; and not the connection between you and the moral law sitting on its throne in the sky. Interactivity, for people – as thinking beings and bodies – and particles of matter alike are always reciprocal and dynamical. In other words, for every reaction there is always an equal and opposite reaction; and wholly the world is persevered through these particular events [b, pp. 51-52]. There exists, however, no reciprocity between the moral law and people if it is lifted from the world and its current conditions. 

Life as an autonomous self, from this account, becomes a form of creative expression – what Nishida calls expressive activity (hyōgen sayō, 表現作用) – which is consistently changing form and thus bleeds content upon the place of its standing and simultaneous birth [c, pp. 52]. It is also referred to later on by Nishida as pure apperception (junsui tōkaku, 純粋統覚) in place of the hyōgen sayō – taking explicit influence from Kant’s own faculty of apperception. Nonetheless, they are very different on the following grounds: junsui tōkaku is not a manner of isolated, ie., detached, thinking of something, but is itself grounded in the material, reflexive behavior of the world. We see this here, where, “…each self-conscious world is a momentary vector of historical world-space, which mediates its own objective self-determination within itself, and infinitely determines itself through its own process of self-expression,” [c, pp. 59]. 

More poignantly; morality, god, and the self are all reformulated as reflections of the self nature and not in reference to some unknowable thing – ie., something noumenal. Thus to know the self, ie., in Kantian terms the transcendental subject or I, we need not search beyond our own immanent place in the world, and constitute perfection as pure ideal. We do not seek to know the theoretical self where this pure reason hangs its hat precisely because there is no posited (or possible) place for its hat to truly hang. There must be a historical, or experiential, component to all facets of reason; and especially to a reason seeking to know itself. And so – from Nishida – the personal self conducted via personality as a point of absolute standing – rather than one of meager particularity or a universally idealized law –  is what dominates the conception of the good for all and what guides the self to act morally through the hyōgen sayō of willing will. Kant, as Nishida puts it, sought to find this transcendent plane for reason to reside in by seeking wholeheartedly to know the fact of knowing, or to know the fact of self – something Kant ultimately dismissed with metaphysics altogether. Whereas Nishida on the other hand sought to know knowing as is, through its existential basis and active forms. Pure perfection, beauty, god, and all those transcendental predicates – according to Nishida – are not just ideals sprung from reason but markers of the self-forming individual. They are not mere postulates of theoretical reason which may exist outside of us, as Kant calls supersensible entities, unprovable by reason’s own design; they are but only through us existent, in so much as through them, too, we exist. To alleviate the headache this paradox may entail, he provides this quote from Daitō Kokushi:

Buddha and I, distinct through a billion kalpas of time,

Yet not separate for one instant;

Facing each other the whole day through,

Yet not facing each other for an instant (c, pp. 78).

The notion of the reflexive nature of the self is solidified here as a dynamic, affirmative and self-negating expressive force reciprocated between the hyōgen sayō and the world’s own fluidity. This world, he makes clear however, is not some abstractable place wherein transcendental, pure reason arises. It is a concrete matrix of the logical form, wherein self-transformation is itself made possible and is ultimately realized. This he refers to as the place (basho, 場所) of all self-conscious activity [c, pp. 73]. A prominent notion, as we see here, of most Japanese philosophy – often dismissed as some phantasmic act of satori or mystic art – is the collapsation of mind-body duality in accordance with one self-realizing entity. Basho is precisely this place from which the hyōgen sayō can be exercised freely, via mediated experiences of the self (or mind) as the world (or body). If we now return to our previous example, as I expounded through Japanese semantics earlier, we can see why the reflective nature of self is important for an overall, mediated process of knowing both the self and other. We actively – as through hyōgen sayō – in assuming the wants of another seek to know the other’s self-expressed desire within; rather than simply assuming them under some I think, I am logical framework.  The (I think) in the (I think) she is wanting an apple is hardly ever exuded in both English and Japanese alike. Nonetheless it is au fond inferred by our expressive activity, to know their knowing and not assume the fact of their self-identity; and most importantly, it is not pursued via reference to the transcendent.

Nishida in offering the basho as the grounds from which peoples reflexively willing will, provides an ardent logical framework for the possibility of individual selves; not as particular vectors, but as absolute ones irr-referentially determined by the monadic world. To this extent perhaps some would read him as far too religious, in a pious sense; or perhaps as a Spizonist wanting to mend the paradoxical world through substance. I do not see either as such, but rather see his brilliance through the semantics themselves. It has been made clear throughout the entirety of this endeavor that language has played a critical role in formulating our arguments; and it is what implicitly sits at the feet of the hyōgen sayō. For language is at best the objective means – ie., as speech, written word, signs, etc. – through which the self is intuited and through which the world is itself crafted. Through our own words and through the words of the world, a reflexive process is always at work – wherein speech enters the ear and proceeds through the lips of the other. There is, for the Kantian defender of the moral self, no such redemptive process of the whole of communication; should god and reason continue to operate above the clouds of our own visibility. They must always refer to themselves above us, or below us, should we try to do the same. There are, rather, in this historical place the others who we surround ourselves with and the water we can peer unabridged upon that allow one – at all times – to see their own self. The world, I hope to have illuminated here, is your mirror. And you, in turn, are hers. 

Notes

aKant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1998.

bKant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Lara Denis. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, The Broadview Press, Canada, 2005.

cNishida, Kitarō. Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, Last Writings. Translated with an introduction by David A. Dilworth, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987.

Hello Philosophers!

From our staff…

Welcome to Bad Subjects! We are the undergraduate philosophy journal of Trinity College, based in Hartford, CT. Our journal will publish the unique voices of our peers on a month to month basis, focusing on a variety of philosophical issues and trains of thought; as well as provide smaller updates to you regarding all of our club activities.

So please read and write us with your suggestions; we hope you’ll join us in rethinking and reshaping the many facets of our community, and more importantly the world. We look forward to your continued support!

Club Spotlight: The Philosophy Club Investigates What is Funny?

Jackson Loze ’24

staff writer

In this week’s philosophy club meeting, the question “what makes something funny” was investigated. The meeting started with a discussion aimed at categorizing all the empirical examples of laughter the group could come up with. This yielded two distinct groups: intentional laughter and unintentional laughter.

Intentional laughter includes moments when you laugh, not because you thought something was funny but instead to conform with social conventions. Examples of this include laughing at your boss’s joke because you want them to view you more favorably or laughing at your friend’s unfunny “joke” to boost their confidence. Lastly, laughing to look as though you understand a joke everyone else is laughing at also fits here. 

Unintentional laughter, as the name suggests, includes moments when you laugh involuntarily. Examples of such laughter include seeing an animal fall in a clumsy and seemingly non-injurious manner. Also, laughter provoked by traumatic experiences, such as being tickled, would also fit into this category. 

In trying to determine whether intentional laughter should be considered legitimate laughter at all, the club was unable to reach a consensus. In support of intentional laughter, it was argued that someone who is in a really bad mood often will not be able to unintentionally express any positively charged emotions, causing them to resort to intentional laughter in order to express their genuine reaction to something humorous (I.e., a grieving widow laughing during a funeral speech). In opposition, the argument was presented that the majority of intentional laughter is not really laughter at all; instead, it was suggested that intentional laughter is really just a noise humans make that kind of sounds like laughter.

After categorizing empirical examples of laughter, the club considered 3 different theories of laughter, which claim to explain why we find things funny.  

Firstly, the club considered the Superiority Theory, which was advanced by Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes.  Simply put, this theory posits that our laughter expresses feelings of superiority over other people or over a former state of ourselves. A contemporary proponent of this theory is Roger Scruton who analyses amusement as an “attentive demolition” of a person or something connected with a person. “If people dislike being laughed at,” Scruton says, “it is surely because laughter devalues its object in the subject’s eyes.”

Secondly, the club considered the Relief Theory of humor which was advanced by philosophers like Freud. Essentially, “The Relief Theory is a hydraulic explanation in which laughter does in the nervous system what a pressure-relief valve does in a steam boiler.” While not commonly taken to be a proponent of the Relief Theory of humor, the club correctly, in my opinion, decided that Adorno’s assessment of humor best fits here; in the Culture Industry, Adorno suggests that the function of laughter is to alleviate the revolutionary desires and tendencies of the masses living in a capitalist economy by constantly distracting them with amusement and laughter. 

Lastly, the club considered the Incongruity Theory of humor, which was advanced by Kant, Kierkegaard, and the majority of contemporary philosophers that are still commenting on humor. Proponents of the Incongruity Theory will typically say that it is the perception of something incongruous, something that violates our mental patterns and expectations, that causes us to laugh. In a unanimous 12-0 decision, the club agreed that this theory of humor had the most explanatory power of the three. 

To attend future philosophy club meetings, please contact our president, Charlotte Bond ’23 (charlotte.bond@trincoll.edu).

Club Spotlight: the Philosophy Club Shares Discourses of Locke’s Views on Substances

Jackson Loze ’24

staff writer

Often described as the “Father of British Empiricism,” John Locke stands as one of the most influential philosophers of the early modern period. In his work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke’s primary aim concerns determining the limits of human understanding to establish what one can and cannot legitimately claim to know. While many philosophers would consider such monumental work to be a success, given the essay’s continued prominence at the foundation of modern philosophical empiricism, some of Locke’s expressed beliefs invite more confusion than clarity for his readers. An example of such opaque beliefs can be seen in Locke’s discussion of the idea of substance in general, a concept that has been debated for centuries. To contribute to the ongoing discussion surrounding Locke’s view of substances, this article will speculate three answers Locke may give to being asked “How do you envision the idea of substance in general?”  

Before offering potential answers, it is important to distinguish what Locke means when he writes about our idea of ‘substance in general.’ Within the historic debate amongst philosophers involving substances, most beliefs can be classified as being either categorical, which pertains to the types of substances that exist (e.g., lead, gold, or God), or metaphysical, which examine our idea of substance and how we conceptualize it. While Locke’s categorical beliefs are also the subject of much controversy, this article will examine his metaphysical views. Put simply, the idea of substance in general is what would be left if all the qualities that distinguish sorts of substances from one another could be stripped away.

Answer #1: “Substance-in-general does not exist and is human invented folk metaphysics”

An interpretation that has risen in popularity has been that Locke does not believe in the existence of substances in general. The textual evidence that supports such interpretation is as follows:

“There is another idea, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have nor can have, by sensation or reflection… We have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition we know not what (i.e., of something whereof we have no distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support of those ideas we do know.”

As seen by his explicit statement “We have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance,” this quote would suggest that Locke believes we have no knowledge of substance in general; however, it is worth noting that after being accused by the Bishop of Worcester Edward Stillingfleet of discarding substances out of the reasonable part of the world, Locke changed this passage from describing substance as “something whereof we have no idea” to “something whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea” in the 4th edition of the essay.

Answer #2: “I view substance-in-general as a featureless substratism”

Given its prominence among secondary literature, the second possible answer I will analyze is that Locke views our idea of substance in general as a featureless substratum, commonly known as the ‘bare particular theory.’  This theory is strikingly similar to Aristotle’s views expressed in Metaphysics, where he claims that the substratum which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. He defines such substratum as “[T]‌hat of which the other things are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else.” The most common piece of textual evidence used to support this interpretation is in book 2, chapter xxiii of Essay Concerning Human Understanding:

“The Mind … takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing … are called so united in one subject … Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves, to suppose some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call Substance … The Idea then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities.”

Based on quotes like this, supporters of the bare particular theory hold that for Locke, substance in general is used solely as a functionalist term. Given that our ability to sense and reflect has left us with ideas of a multitude of both primary and secondary qualities, this interpretation holds that there logically must be something in which those qualities inhere which in and of itself is not a quality. This leaves us with a bare ‘something,’ which has no properties, except the property of being the support of other properties

Answer #3: “I would prefer not to answer”

Due to the importance that the idea of substance had to the Christian religion during the early modern period, an interpretation I believe to be possible is that Locke purposefully kept his stance on substance opaque to avoid either losing favor with or harming the teachings of the Church. In 1697, the Bishop of Worcester Edward Stillingfleet publicly accused Locke of almost discarding substances out of the reasonable part of the world. Stillingfleet worried that Locke’s empiricist philosophy would subvert the Church’s teachings about the Trinity and soul’s immortality given that the concept of substance lies at the heart of both those doctrines. As mentioned previously, such correspondence caused Locke to change a passage in book one of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding from describing substance as “something whereof we have no idea” to “something whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea” in the 4th edition of the essay.

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